





The Unofﬁcial Economy 
and Economic Development
ABSTRACT In developing countries, informal ﬁrms account for up to about
half of all economic activity. Using data from World Bank ﬁrm-level surveys,
we ﬁnd that informal ﬁrms are small and extremely unproductive compared
with even the small formal ﬁrms in the sample, and especially relative to the
larger formal firms. Formal firms are run by much better educated managers
than informal ones and use more capital, have different customers, market
their products, and use more external ﬁnance. Few formal ﬁrms have ever oper-
ated informally. This evidence supports the dual economy (“Wal-Mart”) theory
of development, in which growth comes about from the creation of highly pro-
ductive formal ﬁrms. Informal ﬁrms keep millions of people alive but disappear
as the economy develops.
I
n many developing countries, unofficial economic activity—that con-
ducted by unregistered firms or by registered firms but hidden from
taxation—accounts for between a third and a half of the total. This share
declines sharply as the economy develops. Despite the sheer magnitude of
unofﬁcial activity, little is understood about its role in economic develop-
ment, and in particular about how important “officializing” this hidden
activity and the resources devoted to it might be for economic growth.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on these issues by presenting
some new facts about the unofﬁcial (also called “informal”) economy and
interpreting them in light of various theories. We begin by reviewing the
basic stylized facts: that the unofficial economy is huge, that it shrinks
sharply in relative terms as the economy develops, and that various policy
variables that determine the costs and beneﬁts of becoming and staying
ofﬁcial inﬂuence its size. This evidence is consistent with the generally
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ulations, but lose access to public goods and other beneﬁts of ofﬁcial status,
such as external ﬁnance. Much of the existing literature on the unofﬁcial
economy emphasizes these public policy aspects of the problem.
1
Yet crucial as this perspective might be, it says little about the role of
unofficial firms in development. There are three broad views of this role,
which we refer to as the romantic view, the parasite view, and the dual
economy (“dual” for short) view. According to the romantic view, which
we associate with the work of Hernando de Soto,
2 unofﬁcial ﬁrms are either
actually or potentially extremely productive but are held back by govern-
ment taxes and regulations, as well as by lack of secure property rights and
access to ﬁnance. Pending the necessary legal reforms, “four billion people
around the world are robbed of the chance to better their lives and climb out
of poverty, because they are excluded from the rule of law.”
3 If the barriers
to ofﬁcial status were lowered and capital supplied through microﬁnance,
unofﬁcial ﬁrms would register, borrow, and take advantage of other beneﬁts
of ofﬁcial status, and by doing so expand and spark economic growth. The
key aspect of this optimistic view is that unofﬁcial ﬁrms are fundamentally
similar to ofﬁcial ones but are kept down by policy. In particular, unofﬁcial
ﬁrms should look similar to ofﬁcial ﬁrms with respect to characteristics not
affected by government policies, such as the characteristics of their entre-
preneurs (for example, their education).
The other two views are more skeptical about unofﬁcial ﬁrms and in par-
ticular see them as quite unproductive, not just because they are deprived of
the beneﬁts of ofﬁcial status, but also because they are run by entrepreneurs
with lower human capital. In these alternative views, development comes
about not so much from the unleashing of informal ﬁrms as from their dis-
placement by efﬁcient formal ﬁrms, usually run by totally different people.
This is the “Wal-Mart” theory of development.
The latter two views differ in what they see as the benefits and the
harms of the unofﬁcial sector. The parasite view, associated primarily with
the excellent empirical studies by the McKinsey Global Institute, sees
unofficial firms primarily from the perspective of their illegality. These
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1. This literature includes de Soto (1989), Loayza (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann, and
Shleifer (1997), Friedman and others (2001), Djankov and others (2002), Almeida and
Carneiro (2006), Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste (2008), and Russo (2008), as well
as the recent work on Brazil by De Paula and Scheinkman (2008), Monteiro and Assunção
(2006), and Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes Rojas (2006).
2. De Soto (1989, 2000).
3. United Nations (2008, p. 1).
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scale to produce efﬁciently. However, the “substantial cost advantage that
informal companies gain by avoiding taxes and regulations more than off-
sets their low productivity and small scale.”
4 This cost advantage allows
unofﬁcial ﬁrms to undercut the prices of ofﬁcial ﬁrms. Informal ﬁrms, then,
hurt growth both because their small scale makes them unproductive and
because they take away market share from bigger, more productive formal
competitors. According to one McKinsey report, “The high proportion of
small ﬁrms in service industries makes them particularly likely to operate
informally, ignoring tax requirements, employee beneﬁts, and other regu-
lations. This is a much larger barrier to growth than most policymakers
in emerging—and developed—economies acknowledge. Steps to reduce
informality in local service sectors will be rewarded by rapid increases in
their productivity, growth, and employment.”
5 The ﬁrst step in redressing
the problems created by informal ﬁrms is to “add resources and beef up a
government’s audit capabilities.”
6 More broadly, government policy should
aim to eradicate informal ﬁrms by reducing tax evasion and increasing the
enforcement of government regulations.
The dual view, associated in our minds with traditional development
economics,
7 likewise emphasizes the inherent inefficiency of unofficial
ﬁrms. This view is intimately related to the “big push” models of develop-
ment economics, which see the coordinated transition from the informal,
preindustrial economy to the formal, industrial one as the crucial strategy
of economic development.
8 The earliest formal model of the unofficial
economy is that of James Rauch,
9 who uses the framework of Robert Lucas
to consider the allocation of talent between the unofﬁcial and the ofﬁcial
sectors.
10 In Rauch’s framework, workers with lower human capital work
in informal and smaller ﬁrms and receive lower wages, whereas those with
higher human capital are allocated to the larger and more productive ﬁrms
and receive higher wages.
11
Unlike the romantic view, the dual view predicts that unofﬁcial ﬁrms
should look very different from ofﬁcial ﬁrms in their characteristics not
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11. See also Amaral and Quintin (2006) and de Paula and Scheinkman (2008).
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pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation in order to advertise
their products, raise outside capital, and access public goods. Such entre-
preneurs ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to run the bigger, ofﬁcial ﬁrms than the
smaller, unofﬁcial ones. In contrast, the increase in ﬁrm value that less able
entrepreneurs or managers could generate by operating formally is not
large enough to offset the additional costs from taxes and regulations. The
strong prediction of the dual view is that managers and assets are matched
through a sorting process that results in low-ability managers being paired
with low-quality assets.
Unlike the parasite view, the dual view does not see the unofﬁcial ﬁrms
as threatening the official ones, because they are hugely inefficient and
hence unlikely to be able to charge lower prices for the same products.
Indeed, official and unofficial firms operate largely in different markets
and have different customers. The dual view sees the unofficial firms as
providers of a livelihood to millions, perhaps billions, of extremely poor
people,
12 and it cautions against any policies that would raise the costs of
these ﬁrms. This view sees the hope of economic development in policies,
such as human capital, tax, and regulatory policies, that promote the creation
of ofﬁcial ﬁrms, letting the unofﬁcial ones die as the economy develops.
The ofﬁcial ﬁrms thus created will be new ﬁrms run by new people, not
previously unofﬁcial ﬁrms.
13
To shed light on these alternative views, this paper follows the presen-
tation of basic correlations with a comparative analysis of the characteris-
tics and productivity of ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial ﬁrms in several developing
countries. We use three sets of surveys of both ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial ﬁrms
conducted recently by the World Bank. The ﬁrst set, known as Enterprise
Surveys, covers small, medium-size, and large registered ﬁrms in nearly
100 countries. We use these surveys largely for comparison. The second
set, known as Informal Surveys, covers primarily unregistered, but also
some registered, small ﬁrms in about a dozen countries. The third set, known
as Micro Surveys, covers primarily registered, but also some unregistered,
small ﬁrms in about a dozen countries (mostly different from those covered
by the Informal Surveys). These surveys enable us to make comparative
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12. Tokman (1992).
13. The sharp distinction we have drawn between the parasite and the dual views is too
extreme. For example, informal ﬁrms may compete with formal ones in some industries and
not in others, and they might pose a greater competitive threat at higher levels of economic
development, when they perhaps become more similar to formal ﬁrms. We will return to the
discussion of the relevance of the two views after presenting some of the data.
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rough way—productivity of both ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial ﬁrms.
We note from the start that the data we use have many problems, not
least because we focus on firms that are by definition avoiding the gov-
ernment’s notice. Nonetheless, our ﬁndings tend to favor the dual view
over the romantic and the parasite views. The unofﬁcial ﬁrms in the sur-
veys tend to be small and unproductive compared even with the small but
registered ﬁrms (which themselves are much less productive than larger
registered firms). The unofficial firms also use lower-quality inputs and
have less access to public goods and ﬁnance. Extremely few of the regis-
tered ﬁrms have ever operated as unregistered, again suggesting, as argued
by Rauch,
14 that the two groups are very separate animals. The evidence
points to a substantial difference between the registered and the unregis-
tered ﬁrms in the human capital of their managers and suggests that this
gap in human capital drives many other differences, including the quality
of inputs and access to ﬁnance. The unregistered ﬁrms pay sharply lower
wages to their employees, again consistent with the dual model.
As a final step, we consider how firms perceive their obstacles to
doing business as reported in the three surveys. Informal firms see lack
of access to markets and finance as their biggest problems. Formal firms
also emphasize those, but taxes, tax administration, and problems with
electricity supply as well. The legal system, regulations, and registration
procedures rank lower as obstacles to doing business among both formal
and informal firms. Finally, the surveys offer little evidence that the
unregistered ﬁrms pose much of a competitive threat to the registered ones:
the latter do not treat such competition (or unfair competition more gen-
erally) as a serious problem. This last result does not support the parasite
view of the unofficial economy, which focuses on price undercutting by
informal firms.
Over all, the evidence paints a relatively consistent picture. There is
very little support for the romantic view, and indeed the differences in pro-
ductivity between formal and informal ﬁrms are so large that it is hard to
believe that simply registering unregistered ﬁrms would eliminate the gap.
On the other hand, there is little support for the parasite view either, and the
evidence suggests that subjecting unofﬁcial ﬁrms to stronger enforcement
would devastate the livelihood of millions of people surviving near sub-
sistence. The evidence rather points to the dual view, with the fairly stan-
dard implication that the hope of economic development lies in the creation
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practices, including modern technology, marketing, and ﬁnance.
The Size of the Informal Economy and Its Determinants
Measuring the informal economy is inherently difﬁcult. To start with, the
informal economy encompasses very different phenomena. One is hidden
ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms hide all of their output from the police, the tax authorities,
or the regulators. Another phenomenon is hidden output. Output may be
hidden even by registered ﬁrms to reduce their tax liability. Both phenom-
ena occur in all developing countries. Indeed, the face of informality may
change as the economy develops, from near-universal informality at earlier
stages to mere tax avoidance as the economy grows richer.
Beyond these conceptual issues, there are serious practical problems
in measuring hidden ﬁrms and output. Nevertheless, a variety of methods
have been proposed. Since each method has its strengths and weaknesses,
we gathered data on seven measures of the informal economy based on
alternative methodologies and sources. All these measures of the informal
economy are, if anything, likely to understate its true size.
Surveys are the most direct, although necessarily subjective, measure.
We assembled data on two survey measures. The first is an indicator of
unofficial or unregistered business activity from the World Economic
Forum’s  Global Competitiveness Report 2006–2007.
15 Top business
leaders from 125 countries were asked to estimate the size of the infor-
mal sector using a 1-to-7 scale, where 1 indicates that more than 50 per-
cent of economic activity is unrecorded and 7 that all of it is registered.
For comparability with the other measures, we rescaled this index on a
scale from 0 to 50 percent of GDP. The 50 percent cutoff adopted by the
Global Competitiveness Report is arbitrary and introduces a downward
bias in this measure. The second survey measure is the percentage of
total sales that a typical establishment reports for tax purposes, from the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The respondents are the top managers
of registered businesses in (mostly) developing countries. Accordingly,
this measure of tax evasion likely understates the size of the informal
economy, as entrepreneurs in the informal sector are not surveyed. This
measure of tax evasion is available for 95 countries. Most countries have
been surveyed twice, and we average the available observations between
2002 and 2006.
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observable variables, such as the incidence of micro- and small enterprises,
the male participation rate in the labor force, the fraction of workers con-
tributing to social security, electricity consumption, and currency in circu-
lation. We gathered data on three such indicators.
The ﬁrst is the percentage of the active labor force that is self-employed,
where self-employment is defined by the International Labour Office to
include “jobs where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the proﬁts
derived from the goods and services produced,”
16 but not work by unpaid
family workers, although the incidence of informality among the latter is
probably high. This is admittedly a crude measure. In most developing
countries there is a strong association between self-employment and infor-
mal activity, as most self-employed tend to be low-skilled, unregistered
workers.
17 Of course, self-employment in developing countries may be high
not only because informality is prevalent, but also because self-employment
is common in agriculture. For this reason our second objective indicator
is the percentage of workers in the nonagricultural sector who are self-
employed. Other interpretations of self-employment are also possible. In
particular, self-employment has been used as an indicator of entrepreneurial
activity in the United States. However, the vast majority of self-employed
workers in our data are, in fact, “own-account” workers who do not hire per-
sons to work for them. Camilo Mondragón-Vélez and Ximena Peña-Parga
show along these lines that the self-employed are rarely business owners
in Colombia.
18 Data on self-employment are collected through population
censuses as well as through household or labor force surveys.
19 Data on total
and nonagricultural self-employment are available for 133 countries and
96 countries, respectively, from the International Labour Organization.
The third objective indicator is based on electricity consumption. For
each country the ratio of electricity consumption to GDP for a base period
is calculated and then extrapolated to the present, assuming that the elastic-
ity of electricity consumption to GDP is one.
20 The size of the informal
sector is then computed as the difference between GDP as estimated from
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16. International Labour Ofﬁce (2007).
17. Loayza and Rigolini (2006).
18. Mondragón-Vélez and Peña-Parga (2008).
19. There are two known biases in the self-employment data. First, OECD statistics
relate to civilian employment and, as such, leave out the armed forces. Second, self-
employment statistics in most Latin American countries relate to urban areas only. Both
biases tend to understate the true size of self-employment.
20. Johnson and others (1997); Ernste and Schneider (1998).
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states its size to the extent that informal activities are less electricity inten-
sive than formal activities, and to the extent that technological progress
allows for increased output per unit of electricity. This indicator is avail-
able for 57 countries from Eric Friedman and coauthors.
21
Still another approach to measuring the informal economy models hid-
den output as a latent variable, using several indicator and causal variables.
This is the approach followed by Friedrich Schneider to estimate a multi-
ple indicators, multiple causes (MIMIC) model.
22 The indicator variables
include the labor force participation rate among persons aged 18–64, annual
GDP growth, and the change in local currency in circulation per capita.
The causal variables are the tax-to-GDP ratio, the Heritage Foundation
index of economic freedom, the unemployment rate, GDP per capita, and
lagged values of the latent variable. This measure of the informal economy,
which is available for 145 countries,
23 is only as good as the model that
supports it. Later in this section we present evidence that the correlation
between the size of the informal economy and variables such as tax rates is
not particularly robust.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we gathered data on a direct measure of the
formal economy: the number of registered businesses per 1,000 inhabitants.
This measure, too, has problems. The number of firms per capita may
increase with development, for example, as product variety expands. It
may also be affected by cross-country differences in entrepreneurship.
Finally, the data on total registered ﬁrms may be biased upward, especially
in developing countries, because of underreporting of ﬁrms that have closed
or exited. Data on the number of registered businesses are available for
83 countries from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset.
We group the determinants of the size of the unofficial economy into
three broad categories: the cost of becoming formal, the cost of staying
formal, and the beneﬁts of being formal. As a proxy for the cost of becom-
ing formal, we use the logarithm of the number of procedures required to
legally start a business, from the 2002 paper by Simeon Djankov and
coauthors and the World Bank’s Doing Business 2008.
24 The costs of stay-
ing formal include paying taxes and obeying government regulations; we
use six proxies for these costs. First, we use two measures of the cost of
282 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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23. Schneider (2007).
24. World Bank (2007); Djankov and others (2002).
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(except for labor taxes) payable by businesses after accounting for deduc-
tions and exemptions; and the time it takes to prepare, ﬁle, and pay (or
withhold) corporate income tax, value-added tax, and social security con-
tributions, in hours per year. Second, we capture the cost of complying
with labor laws with three variables: an index of the difﬁculty of hiring a
new worker; an index of the difﬁculty and expense of ﬁring a redundant
worker; and the nonwage labor costs (payroll taxes and social security pay-
ments) associated with hiring a new worker as a percentage of the worker’s
salary. Data on complying with labor laws are from Juan Botero and coau-
thors and Doing Business 2008.
26 Third, we capture the cost of red tape
using the percentage of senior management’s time spent in dealing with
requirements imposed by government regulations (such as taxes, cus-
toms, labor regulations, licensing, and registration); this includes time
spent interacting with ofﬁcials, completing forms, and other tasks. This
variable is from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.
The beneﬁts of being formal include expanded access to both public
goods and ﬁnance. Regarding public goods, registered business may ﬁnd it
easier than unregistered ones to use the courts to enforce property rights
and adjudicate disputes. We use two proxies for the efﬁciency of courts:
the log of the number of steps required to collect on a bounced check, from
the 2003 paper by Djankov and coauthors and Doing Business 2008;
27
and the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure, from a recent paper by
Djankov and coauthors.
28 We measure the quality of property rights using
indices of corruption and the rule of law from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay,
and Massimo Mastruzzi.
29 In addition, we use the density of the paved road
network from World Development Indicators as a rough proxy for the
scope of the domestic market. Finally, we measure the beneﬁts of access to
finance using three indicators of the size of financial markets. The first
two indicators are standard: private credit and the market capitalization of
domestic ﬁrms, both as a ratio to GDP. These two variables are also from
the World Development Indicators. The third measure of the size of ﬁnan-
cial markets is a subjective indicator of the ease of access to credit, from
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2006–2007.
The index ranges from 1 (impossible) to 7 (easy).
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27. Djankov and others (2003).
28. Djankov and others (2008a).
29. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).
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Countries are grouped into quartiles based on average income per capita at
purchasing power parity (PPP) over the period 1996–2006. In practice,
measures of the informal sector based on multiple indicators, energy con-
sumption, self-employment, and the World Economic Forum survey are
highly correlated with each other (see the correlation table in the appendix).
In contrast, tax evasion and the number of registered businesses are less
correlated with these other four indicators.
Two facts stand out. First, the informal economy in the average country
in the sample is large, ranging from 22.5 percent of the total economy
according to the tax evasion measure to 34.5 percent according to the mul-
tiple indicators approach. These numbers are especially large in light of
the fact that our measures are likely biased down. About 26.5 percent of
a country’s workers, on average, are self-employed. That figure rises to
30.8 percent in the nonagricultural sector. Respondents to the World
Economic Forum survey estimate that 27.6 percent of output is informal.
Estimates based on electricity consumption suggest that 29.0 percent of
output is informal. The various estimates thus suggest that, in an average
country, roughly 30 percent of the economy is informal.
Second, the size of the informal economy is strongly negatively corre-
lated with income per capita. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship, using
the multiple indicators variable to measure the informal economy. The
other measures also show the informal economy to be very large in poor
countries, ranging from 29.0 percent according to the tax evasion measure
to 57.3 percent according to the nonagricultural self-employment measure.
The measure from the World Economic Forum survey suggests that the
informal economy is 18 percentage points larger in poor countries than in
rich ones. Estimates based on electricity consumption and multiple indica-
tors suggest that the informal economy is between 21 and 24 percentage
points larger, respectively, in poor countries than in rich ones. Even tax
evasion by registered businesses—which is likely to understate tax evasion
in poor countries—is 21 percentage points higher in poor countries than
in rich ones. The self-employment statistics show that the fraction of self-
employed workers rises from 13.3 percent in rich countries to 46.4 percent
in poor ones. (Figure 2 illustrates the striking relationship between self-
employment and income per capita.) The pattern for nonagricultural
self-employment is even more extreme: self-employment as a share of
nonagricultural employment rises by 44.8 percentage points as one moves
from rich countries to poor ones. Consistent with this pattern, the number
of registered businesses rises from 3.2 to 41.8 per thousand inhabitants as
284 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 285one moves from poor to rich countries. These ﬁndings suggest that under-
standing the decline of informal firms as countries grow richer may be
central to development economics.
Table 2 examines the determinants of the size of the informal sector.
We present results ﬁrst without (top panel) and then with GDP per capita
(bottom panel) in the regression. The dependent variables are ﬁve of the
above proxies for the size of the informal economy as well as the number
of registered businesses per capita. (We omit the results using nonagricul-
tural self-employment as they are qualitatively similar to those for total
self-employment.) The independent variables are proxies for the cost of
becoming formal and the costs and beneﬁts of operating in the formal sec-
tor. Each cell in each panel presents the results from a single univariate
regression (we do not report the constant).
The results in the top panel show the influence of policy variables.
First, our proxy for the cost of becoming formal—the number of proce-
dures necessary to start a business—is consistently associated with a larger











































































































































7 8 9 10 11
Log of GDP per capita at purchasing power parityb
Informal share of GDP, multiple indicators measure (percent)a 
Sources: Schneider (2007); World Bank, World Development Indicators.
a. Average of the observations available for 1999–2004.
b. Average for 1996–2006.
Figure 1. Size of the Informal Economy and GDP per Capita
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 286informal sector as well as with fewer registered firms. However, the
economic effect is modest in size. For example, a 1-standard-deviation
(equal to 0.4) increase in the log of the number of procedures is associated
with a 4.8-percentage-point rise in the multiple indicators measure of
the informal economy.
Second, the results for proxies for the cost of staying formal are mixed.
All six proxies are statistically signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is
the measure from the World Economic Forum survey (ﬁrst data column).
On the other hand, none of the explanatory variables is signiﬁcant when
using the tax evasion proxy. Results for the other dependent variables are
in between these two extremes. Among the explanatory variables in this
category, the most consistently signiﬁcant one is the time required to com-
ply with taxes, which is signiﬁcant for all dependent variables except tax
evasion. Even then, increasing the time required to comply with taxes by
1 standard deviation (0.75) is associated with an increase of only 4.8 per-
centage points in the multiple indicators measure.





























































































































6 7 8 9 10 11
Log of GDP per capita at purchasing power parityb
Percent of active labor force that is self-employeda
Sources: International Labour Office (2007); World Bank, World Development Indicators.
a. Data are as of the most recent year available.
b. Average for 1996–2006.
Figure 2. Self-Employment and GDP per Capita

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 290Third, the proxies for the beneﬁts of being formal are consistently asso-
ciated with the size of the informal sector and the number of registered
ﬁrms: the only two exceptions are court formalism (the number of steps
necessary to collect on a bounced check) in the regressions for tax evasion
and registered ﬁrms. The economic impact, in terms of the multiple indica-
tors measure, of increasing these variables by 1 standard deviation ranges
from 5.8 percentage points for court formalism to 9.6 percentage points for
the rule of law. In sum, without controlling for income per capita, both the
cost of becoming formal and the beneﬁts of operating in the formal sector
have a reliable but modest impact on the size of the informal economy. Our
proxies for the cost of operating in the formal sector also have a modest
effect but are less often signiﬁcant.
Next, we rerun the previous regressions adding GDP per capita as an
independent variable. The motivation is that the extent of the informal
economy may be correlated with a country’s development level. In poor
countries the informal economy may provide subsistence income for work-
ers unable to ﬁnd formal employment. To the extent that informal ﬁrms
avoid labor laws, the beneﬁts of informality may be larger in the labor-
intensive activities common in poor countries than in the capital-intensive
activities common in rich countries. Along the same lines, informality may
decline as more transactions are intermediated through the ﬁnancial system.
Finally, tax compliance may rise with income per capita as governments
become more efficient at collecting taxes.
The bottom panel of table 2 shows the coefﬁcients for the variables of
interest when we control for GDP per capita. (As in the top panel, we do not
report the constant. Nor do we report the coefﬁcient for GDP per capita, but
it is strongly signiﬁcant in all regressions.) Most of the estimated coefﬁcients
fall in value and lose signiﬁcance compared with the regressions without
GDP per capita. Indeed, the coefficients remain consistently significant
(11 of the 15 regressions) only for the World Economic Forum survey.
Results for the other dependent variables are mostly insigniﬁcant. Our
proxy for the cost of becoming formal remains signiﬁcant in four of the six
regressions (World Economic Forum survey, tax evasion, multiple indica-
tors, and registered ﬁrms). Among the proxies for the cost of operating in the
formal sector, the strongest variable is the time to comply with taxes, which
is signiﬁcant in four of the six regressions. Yet in contrast to the results on
tax rates, nonwage costs are signiﬁcant in only one regression. Finally,
among the proxies for the beneﬁts of operating in the formal sector, the
strongest variables are road density (signiﬁcant in four regressions) and the
subjective assessment of access to credit (signiﬁcant in ﬁve regressions).
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kets are mixed: private credit remains signiﬁcant in three regressions, but
market capitalization does so in only two regressions.
In sum, GDP per capita is the most robust predictor of the size of the
informal economy. The most straightforward interpretation of the results
in this section is that the informal economy is a manifestation of under-
development. It recedes as the economy develops, perhaps because public
goods become better and financial markets larger, or because avoiding
detection becomes harder. It remains a crucial, and open, question whether
this decline of the informal sector results from the conversion of informal
ﬁrms to ofﬁcial status, or from their death and replacement by formal ﬁrms.
An alternative interpretation is that we are overcorrecting by includ-
ing GDP per capita. In particular, GDP per capita is strongly correlated
(70 percent or better) with the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, pri-
vate credit, corruption, and the rule of law (see the correlation table in
the appendix). Interestingly, variables that explicitly capture a country’s
economic structure (such as the share of agriculture in GDP; results not
reported) leave much of the explanatory power of GDP per capita unchanged.
Although GDP per capita is strongly correlated with some of the determi-
nants of the size of the informal economy, multicollinearity is unlikely to
explain why tax rates, nonwage costs, and labor laws work so poorly when
we control for GDP per capita. We return to this issue below when we
examine the productivity of informal ﬁrms, using micro data.
Although the cross-country evidence reveals some interesting patterns,
it is merely suggestive and does not discriminate among the three views
of the role of the informal economy. For this we need micro data, which
we analyze next. Accordingly, the remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section describes our data on informal and formal ﬁrms.
We ask such questions as: Are informal firms engines of growth as the
romantic view would hold? For example, do informal ﬁrms grow quickly
and over time join the formal sector? Is there evidence that—consistent
with the parasite view—formal and informal firms operate in the same
markets or that formal ﬁrms fear competition from informal ﬁrms? What
evidence is there that—as predicted by the dual view—informal ﬁrms have
inferior assets and management?
The third section is the heart of the paper. It presents evidence on the
relative productivity of formal and informal ﬁrms. We ask ﬁve questions.
First, are our data on productivity reliable? Second, how big are the differ-
ences in productivity between formal and informal ﬁrms? We want to know
whether the prediction of the parasite view that informal ﬁrms have a cost
292 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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omy are consistent with the observed differences in productivity? We want
to examine whether it is plausible to believe—as in the romantic view—that
all that is holding back informal ﬁrms are high taxes and bad government
regulation. Fourth, what accounts for the difference in the productivity of
formal and informal ﬁrms? The goal is to see whether differences in pro-
ductivity can be traced to differences in inputs. Finally, what evidence is
there that more-able managers run ﬁrms with better assets? Evidence of a
strong selection effect would support the dual view and cast doubt on the
prediction of the romantic view that relieving informal ﬁrms from oppres-
sive taxes and regulation would put an end to poverty as we know it.
The fourth section focuses on obstacles to doing business, as reported
by ﬁrms in all three surveys. We ask which of several problems, such as
market access, ﬁnancing, taxes, and regulations, but also unfair competi-
tion, are perceived as principal obstacles to doing business. These results
shed light on the alternative theories but perhaps bear most directly on the
parasite theory. The ﬁnal section concludes with some implications of the
evidence.
Characteristics of Informal Firms
In this section we describe our data and present simple descriptive statistics.
Our basic approach is to compare, country by country, the relative perfor-
mance of formal and informal ﬁrms. To do so, we combine data from three
World Bank surveys of individual ﬁrms. The ﬁrst survey—the Enterprise
Survey—covers formal ﬁrms and is available for 105 countries. The other
two surveys—the Informal and Micro Surveys—contain information on
both informal and formal firms in a few poor countries. The Informal
Survey is available for 13 countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal,
Tanzania, and Uganda.
30 With the exception of Brazil, all these countries
were below the world median income per capita in 2003 (equal to $5,322),
and 7 out of 13 were below the 25th percentile (equal to $1,682). The Micro
Survey is available for 14 mostly African countries: Angola, Botswana,
Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, India, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, and
Uganda. With the exception of Botswana, all were below the world median
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the 25th percentile (equal to $1,965). The concept of informality used in the
Informal and Micro Surveys focuses on registration (as we discuss below,
there are several possible kinds of registration). Although questions about
tax avoidance are asked, they are indirect. As discussed in the preceding
section, this deﬁnition has both advantages and conceptual limitations.
Before describing the data in detail, we need to preempt a possible mis-
conception about the nature of the ﬁrms in our data. In the context of poor
countries, the term “informal ﬁrm” evokes the image of street hawkers
selling goods out of baskets, or of eateries in front of homes. In fact, such an
image is a good description of how the very poor make a living.
31 However,
the informal ﬁrms in our sample do not ﬁt that image. For example, ﬁrms
accounting for roughly 85 percent of the observations in the Informal and
Micro Surveys have, in addition to the entrepreneur, two employees or
more. The informal ﬁrms in our sample are likely to be substantially more
productive than the own-account workers described by Abhijit Banerjee
and Esther Duﬂo.
Data
All three World Bank surveys have a similar structure and differ mainly
in the ﬁrms that they sample. It is easiest to start by describing the Enter-
prise Survey, the source for our control group of registered or formal ﬁrms.
It covers mainly manufacturing and certain services ﬁrms with ﬁve or more
employees in 105 countries. The earliest available data are from 2002 and
the latest from 2007. The initial step in carrying out an Enterprise Survey
involves contacting the government statistical ofﬁce of the relevant country
to request a list of registered establishments. In some instances the World
Bank supplements the government’s list with ﬁrms registered with the
chamber of commerce of the relevant country or listed by Dun & Bradstreet
or by similar private vendors of business directories. Thus, although ﬁrms
in the Enterprise Survey may hide some of their output, the government
typically knows of their existence. We refer to these ﬁrms as “registered”
and deﬁne the term below. The next step involves contacting the ﬁrms that
will be sampled. Enterprise Surveys use either simple random sampling or
random stratiﬁed sampling. A local World Bank contractor telephones each
ﬁrm to set up an interview with the person who most often deals with banks
or government agencies. At that stage, ﬁrms with fewer than ﬁve employees
are dropped from the sample, as are government-owned establishments,
294 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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sizes range between 250 and 1,500 businesses per country. As described on
the Enterprise Surveys website, “The core questionnaire is organized in two
parts. The ﬁrst part seeks managers’ opinions on the . . . business environ-
ment. The second part focuses on productivity measures and is often com-
pleted with the help of the chief accountant or human resource manager.”
The World Bank has also conducted separate surveys of informal ﬁrms
to complement the Enterprise Survey in countries with large informal
economies. Initially, data on the unofﬁcial sector were collected through
the “Informal Sector” questionnaire. Starting in 2005, the World Bank
switched to the “Micro Sector” questionnaire while phasing out the Infor-
mal Sector questionnaire. Institutional amnesia makes it hard to ascertain
the precise methodology followed with the Informal Sector questionnaire.
Nevertheless, the basic outlines of what was done are clear. World Bank
contractors identiﬁed neighborhoods perceived to have a large number of
informal ﬁrms. These neighborhoods were then divided into enumeration
blocks, which were then surveyed on foot.
32
A similar methodology was followed to implement the Micro Sector
questionnaire. A local contractor selected districts and zones within each
district where, based on national information sources, there was a high
concentration of establishments with fewer than ﬁve employees (“micro”
establishments). The contractor then created a comprehensive list of all
establishments in these zones. Finally, the contractor selected randomly
from that list and went door to door to set up interviews with the top man-
agers of the selected establishments. Although the Micro Survey targets
establishments with fewer than ﬁve employees, larger establishments are
not dropped from the sample. In fact, establishments with fewer than ﬁve
employees account for only 50 percent of the Micro Survey sample.
Participation in the surveys is voluntary, and respondents are not paid
to participate.
33 Respondents are asked sequentially about the business
environment, infrastructure, government relations, employment, ﬁnancing,
and ﬁrm productivity. There is some variation in the response rate across
questions. To illustrate, out of 6,466 Informal and Micro ﬁrms surveyed,
we have the age of 6,412 firms, the number of employees of 6,416 firms,
the sales of 6,136 firms, the fraction of investment financed internally of
5,689 ﬁrms, assessments of the fraction of taxes typically evaded by ﬁrms
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Since Informal and Micro ﬁrms typically do not keep detailed records of
their operations, some respondents may simply not have the information
being asked. Unfortunately, we have no way of quantifying the biases, if
any, from missing data.
Critically, the Informal and Micro Surveys cover registered ﬁrms as well
as ﬁrms that exist without the government’s knowledge (“unregistered”
ﬁrms). In the remainder of this paper, we focus on informality understood
in terms of hidden ﬁrms rather than hidden output. To compare the perfor-
mance of registered and unregistered ﬁrms, we need to deﬁne what it means
to be registered. The questions regarding the legal status of the ﬁrm are
worded differently in the Informal and the Micro questionnaires. In the
Informal Survey we rely on the respondent’s answer to whether ﬁrms are
“registered with any agency of the central government.” In practical terms,
ﬁrms are registered with an agency of the central government if they have
obtained a tax identification number. In the Micro Survey, we rely on
the respondent’s answer to whether ﬁrms have either “registered with the
Ofﬁce of the Registrar . . . or other government institutions responsible for
commercial registration” or “obtained a tax identiﬁcation number from the
tax administration or other agency responsible for tax registration.”
34 Both
surveys also keep track of whether firms are registered with “any local
government agency” or with any “industry board or agency.” We focus on
registration with the central government because this form of registration
is more directly relevant to avoiding taxes, enforcing contracts, and raising
ﬁnance. We will also present statistics on municipal and industry board
registration. In sum, the Informal and Micro Surveys allow us to examine
the productivity of (small) registered and unregistered ﬁrms, whereas the
Enterprise Survey provides information on the productivity of registered
ﬁrms that have at least ﬁve employees.
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 3 and 4 list the countries surveyed and present the number of
observations and average sales for the Informal and Micro samples, respec-
tively. Most of the surveys (19 out of a total of 27) were carried out in
African countries, but 6 surveys were done in Asia and 2 in Latin America.
India, Uganda, and Tanzania were surveyed with both the Informal and the
Micro questionnaires. As indicated earlier, most countries covered by the
296 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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current purchasing power terms is roughly $2,400 and ranges from $281 in
Congo to $12,744 in Botswana.
The Informal Survey covered 13 countries. The surveys were typically
carried out in 2003 and, on average, have 223 ﬁrms with nonmissing sales
in each country. The Micro Surveys were carried out in 14 countries in
2006 and, on average, have 214 ﬁrms with nonmissing sales per country.
The World Bank also carried out Enterprise Surveys in parallel with the
relevant Informal and Micro Surveys. We use ﬁrms from the Enterprise
Survey as the control group. The average number of ﬁrms in the control
group with available sales data is 474 for the Informal sample and 554 for
the Micro sample and ranges from 53 in Niger (table 3) to 3,860 in India
(table 4).
Throughout the paper we emphasize productivity differences between
registered and unregistered ﬁrms and between small and big ﬁrms. Criti-
cally, whereas ﬁrms in the Informal Survey are typically unregistered, ﬁrms
in the Micro Survey are typically registered. The average Informal Survey
has 31 registered firms out of a total of 223 firms, whereas the average
Micro Survey has 137 registered firms out of a total of 214 firms. To
examine differences in size, we group Enterprise Survey ﬁrms into three
categories according to the number of employees: fewer than 20 (“small”),
between 20 and 99 (“medium”), and 100 or more (“big”). When assessing
some of our results on productivity, it is worth keeping in mind that the
distribution of firms across these three categories is fairly uneven. For
example, there is 1 big ﬁrm with nonmissing sales data (out of 93) in the
control group for ﬁrms in Cape Verde, but there are 337 (out of 640) in the
control group for ﬁrms in Indonesia (table 3). Perhaps because of the small
number of observations, there are few extreme outliers in the data; these
most likely result from errors in currency units. To mitigate the role of out-
liers, we cap at the 95th percentile the value of sales, sales per employee,
and value added per employee in each country and in each survey. Capping
does not qualitatively change the results we present.
The most striking fact in tables 3 and 4 is that the average annual sales
of ﬁrms in the Informal and Micro Surveys are tiny even in comparison
with those of small ﬁrms in the Enterprise Survey. Speciﬁcally, average
sales are $24,671 for Informal Survey ﬁrms but $948,805 for small ﬁrms in
the Enterprise Survey control group for those countries. Similarly, average
sales are $50,853 for Micro Survey ﬁrms but $354,318 for small ﬁrms in
that control group. Unregistered ﬁrms are even smaller than the average ﬁrm
in the Informal and Micro Surveys. For example, in the Informal Survey
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11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 301sample, average sales for unregistered Brazilian ﬁrms are $32,528, com-
pared with $51,227 for registered ﬁrms. Looking across countries, unregis-
tered ﬁrms in the Informal Survey sample have average sales of $23,509,
compared with $36,240 for registered ﬁrms. Similarly, unregistered ﬁrms
in the Micro Survey sample have average sales of $29,994, compared with
$59,335 for registered ﬁrms. It is natural to worry that the reported sales of
unregistered ﬁrms may be low because respondents lie about their output.
We address this issue in the third section of the paper.
What do unregistered ﬁrms do? Tables 5 and 6 shed light on some of the
basic characteristics of ﬁrms in the Informal and Micro Surveys, respec-
tively. The two tables have a similar—but not identical—structure, since
there are only small differences between the two questionnaires. For each
variable we present the mean for each group (for example, unregistered,
registered, small, medium, and big) as well as the differences between the
means for selected groups of interest (for example, small versus unregis-
tered) and their statistical signiﬁcance. So that the results are not driven by
the countries with the most observations, we ﬁrst average all observations
within a country and then compute means and t statistics across countries.
The ﬁrst block of variables in table 5 shows some general characteristics
of the ﬁrms. Unregistered ﬁrms, although younger (9.9 years on average)
than the average ﬁrm in the control group (17.8 years), have been operating
for quite a long time. By deﬁnition, unregistered ﬁrms are not registered
with the central government. Yet 34 percent of them are registered with a
local government agency, and 7.2 percent are registered with an industry
board or agency.
The next four variables describe the assets owned by ﬁrms in the Infor-
mal Survey. Unregistered ﬁrms own, on average, 52.3 percent of the land
and 45.1 percent of the buildings that they occupy. Registered ﬁrms have
comparable ﬁgures (55.5 percent and 48.1 percent). In contrast, ﬁrms in
the Enterprise Survey control group own a significantly larger fraction
of the land and buildings that they occupy (on average, 67.4 percent and
71.2 percent, respectively). The ownership of electric generators—a key
asset in poor countries—shows a similar pattern. Few ﬁrms, unregistered
or registered, in the Informal Survey own a generator (5.5 percent and
5.1 percent, respectively). In contrast, 20.1 percent of small firms and
77.0 percent of big ﬁrms in the Enterprise Survey own a generator. Capac-
ity utilization rates vary little between unregistered Informal Survey ﬁrms
and Enterprise Survey ﬁrms (61.9 percent versus 68.2 percent, respectively).
The evidence also suggests that unregistered and registered ﬁrms may not
share the same clients. In the Informal Survey, only 1.2 percent of the
302 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 302unregistered firms make the largest fraction of their sales to large firms.
In contrast, large ﬁrms are the main client of 13.5 percent of registered
firms—a percentage comparable to the average firm in the Enterprise
Survey (15.1 percent).
The next block of variables describes the employees and their human
capital in the Informal Survey. Unsurprisingly, unregistered ﬁrms have the
smallest average number of employees (3.9). More interestingly, registered
ﬁrms in the Informal Survey and small ﬁrms in the Enterprise Survey have
very similar employment levels (9.8 and 10.3 employees, respectively).
The key fact regarding informal ﬁrms is that—consistent with the dual view
but not with the other two views—their top managers have low human
capital. For example, the probability that the top manager of a ﬁrm has
some college education is only 6.1 percent in the Informal Survey if the
ﬁrm is unregistered, compared with 15.9 percent for registered ﬁrms in the
same survey and 63.9 percent for all ﬁrms in the Enterprise Survey. To
summarize the differences in human capital, we created an index ranging
from 1 to 4 according to whether the top manager’s highest level of educa-
tion attended was primary school, secondary school, vocational school,
or college. This index equals 1.6 for managers of unregistered ﬁrms and
3.3 for managers of Enterprise Survey ﬁrms. We constructed a similar
index for the employees, with strikingly different results. Employees of
Informal Survey ﬁrms have levels of education very similar to those of
Enterprise Survey ﬁrms (indexes of 2.4 and 2.3, respectively).
Next, we turn to how ﬁrms are ﬁnanced. All views of informality agree
that greater access to finance is an important benefit of operating in the
formal sector. In fact, roughly 75.1 percent of the unregistered Informal
Survey ﬁrms have never even had a commercial loan. Instead, they ﬁnance
74.9 percent of investment with internal funds and 10.5 percent with help
from the owner’s family. The most striking fact about ﬁnancing is that all
small ﬁrms—not just unregistered ones—lack access to ﬁnance. In fact,
small ﬁrms in the Enterprise Survey ﬁnance 67.8 percent of their invest-
ment with internal funds and 6.3 percent with family funds. Big ﬁrms in
the Enterprise Survey have more access to external ﬁnance than small ones.
For example, internal funds pay for 50.4 percent of the investment of big
ﬁrms. Yet the fact that all small ﬁrms lack access to ﬁnance suggests that it
may be misguided to put access to finance for unregistered firms at the
center of the development agenda.
Finally, contrary to the romantic view, there is no evidence in the
Informal Survey that unregistered ﬁrms are dynamic engines of employ-
ment creation. Two-year growth rates of employment are 5.2 percent for
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 303































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 308unregistered ﬁrms, 7.1 percent for registered ﬁrms, and 10.0 percent for all
Enterprise Survey ﬁrms.
Firms in the Micro Survey sample show patterns very similar to those
in the Informal Survey sample (table 6). We therefore discuss them only
brieﬂy, focusing on the questions that are available only on the Micro Sur-
vey questionnaire and on the few results that are different between the two
questionnaires. The Micro questionnaire provides a bit more insight into the
ﬁrms’ assets. Only 17.2 percent of the unregistered ﬁrms and 13.4 percent
of the registered ones are located in the owner’s house. Most unregistered
(71.4 percent) and registered (80.4 percent) firms occupy a permanent
structure. However, there is evidence of hardship resulting from the lack of
secure title:
35 11.3 percent of unregistered ﬁrms and 8.8 percent of regis-
tered ﬁrms were forced to move in the previous year for this reason.
Much like their counterparts in the Informal Survey, unregistered ﬁrms
in the Micro Survey sample are significantly less likely to own a genera-
tor than all other firms. This lack of generators is suggestive of insuffi-
cient capital, since unregistered ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to have
an electrical connection than registered ones (60 percent versus 79.2 per-
cent). Furthermore, unregistered firms are much less likely to use their
own transportation equipment than registered ﬁrms (6.6 percent versus
22.9 percent). Consistent with the view that unregistered ﬁrms and Enter-
prise Survey ﬁrms may serve different clients, big Enterprise Survey ﬁrms
export 19.9 percent of their sales, whereas unregistered ﬁrms export only
0.1 percent of their sales. Finally, there is evidence that unregistered ﬁrms
have less access to computers than do other ﬁrms. In particular, unregis-
tered ﬁrms are less likely to use e-mail to communicate with their clients
than either registered firms or Enterprise Survey firms (3.2, 9.1, and
39.0 percent, respectively). Similarly, unregistered ﬁrms are less likely to
use a webpage to connect with clients than either registered ﬁrms or Enter-
prise Survey ﬁrms (0.9, 2.8, and 14.1 percent, respectively). Consistent
with the dual view, unregistered ﬁrms tend to own low-quality assets.
Unregistered ﬁrms in the Micro sample—unlike their counterparts in
the Informal sample—have a faster growth rate of employment than ﬁrms
in the Enterprise Survey. Average annual employment growth among
unregistered firms (24.3 percent), although not quite matching that of
registered firms (27.1 percent), exceeds that of Enterprise Survey firms
(17.6 percent). The fast employment growth rate of unregistered Micro
Survey firms is consistent with the romantic view. However, this finding
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 309
35. De Soto (2000).
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 309needs to be interpreted cautiously, since these firms remain very small
despite having been around for an average of 7 years.
To complement the evidence on growth rates, we examine, for a few
countries, how often registered ﬁrms initially started operating as unregis-
tered. The Enterprise Survey ﬁles for 14 Latin American countries include
a question on whether ﬁrms were registered when they started operations
and, if not, on whether they have since registered. As it turns out, all ﬁrms
in this sample of 14 countries are registered. Table 7 shows the available
data regarding the initial legal status of these ﬁrms. The fraction of ﬁrms
that were registered from the outset ranges from 77.7 percent in El Salvador
to 98 percent in Chile and averages 91.2 percent. Since 1.3 percent of the
respondents did not answer the question, we estimate that only 7.5 percent
of the ﬁrms registered after starting operations. Firms that start operations
without being registered often register relatively quickly: 36.5 percent of
the initially unregistered ﬁrms had registered by the end of the second year
of operations (table 8). It is unclear whether those ﬁrms spent two years
hiding from the government or, alternatively, started operations while their
request for a permit was pending. Either way, ﬁrms rarely start as unregis-
tered and later change their status. This is not the pattern that one would
expect to see if the informal sector were a reservoir of entrepreneurial
talent, as predicted by the romantic view. Nor is it the pattern that one would
310 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
Table 7. Legal Status of Enterprise Survey Firms in Latin America
Percent of ﬁrms  Percent not 
No. of  that registered  knowing when ﬁrm  Firm age 
Country observations upon formation was registered (years)
Argentina 1,051 92.8 1.1 28.6
Bolivia 609 85.7 0.7 21.8
Chile 1,007 98.0 1.0 26.6
Colombia 995 89.0 0.5 17.0
Ecuador 652 91.6 0.9 21.3
El Salvador 683 77.7 1.4 21.4
Guatemala 511 90.4 2.1 20.9
Honduras 424 89.4 2.8 20.5
Mexico 1,439 94.9 2.8 18.5
Nicaragua 474 80.4 0.8 22.9
Panama 601 97.8 0.5 24.5
Paraguay 608 94.4 0.8 21.3
Peru 630 96.8 0.3 19.8
Uruguay 607 97.5 2.3 28.8
Average 91.2 1.3 22.4
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2006.
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 310expect to see if entrepreneurs used entry into the informal sector as a way of
acquiring information (for example, about demand for the ﬁrm’s products)
at a lower cost than entry into the formal sector.
36
We conclude this section by presenting some data on the institutional
environment in which ﬁrms operate. All views of informality agree on the
basic trade-off faced by ﬁrms (the tax and regulatory burden versus access
to public goods and ﬁnance). The previous literature has emphasized access
to public goods as one of the main attractions of operating in the formal
sector. Tables 9 and 10 present data on the institutional environment faced
by ﬁrms in the Informal and the Micro Surveys, respectively, and how they
operate in it.
Three facts stand out. First, consistent with all views of informality,
unregistered ﬁrms enjoy tangible advantages. Managers of unregistered
firms in the Informal sample estimate that a typical firm in their sector
evades 74.8 percent of its tax liability. Tax evasion sharply decreases with
ﬁrm size. For example, managers of small ﬁrms in the control group estimate
that a typical ﬁrm in their sector evades 35.5 percent of its liability; tax
evasion drops to 22.9 percent for big ﬁrms in the control group. Tax evasion
by unregistered Micro Survey ﬁrms and by small ﬁrms in their control group
follows a similar pattern (67.7 percent versus 44.4 percent, respectively).
Likewise, the regulatory burden increases rapidly with ﬁrm size. Whereas
managers of unregistered firms in the Informal Survey sample report
spending 5.6 percent of their time dealing with government regulations,
that task requires 14.5 percent of the time of managers of big ﬁrms in the
control group; the corresponding ﬁgures for the Micro Survey sample and
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 311
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Table 8. Delays in Registering by Enterprise Survey Firms in Latin America
Yearsa Frequency Percent of total Cumulative percent
1 129 17.9 17.9
2 134 18.6 36.5
3 79 11.0 47.5
4 52 7.2 54.7
5 58 8.1 62.8
6 26 3.6 66.4
7 28 3.9 70.3
8 19 2.6 72.9
9 22 3.1 76.0
10 23 3.2 79.2
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2006.
a. Year of operations in which the ﬁrm registered.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 315its control group are 1.5 and 10.5 percent, respectively. Finally, unregistered
ﬁrms pay a smaller fraction of their sales in bribes than do ﬁrms in the con-
trol group. Managers of unregistered ﬁrms in the Informal Survey estimate
that ﬁrms in their sectors pay 3.6 percent of their sales to “get things done.”
In contrast, managers of registered ﬁrms in the Informal Survey report that
bribes equal 4.8 percent of sales, a percentage similar to that reported by
ﬁrms in the control group (4.6 percent). Similarly, managers of unregistered
ﬁrms in the Micro Survey estimate that ﬁrms in their sector pay 4.0 percent
of their sales to “get things done”; the comparable ﬁgures are 3.5 percent
for registered Micro Survey ﬁrms and 6.6 percent for ﬁrms in the control
group. In sum, lower taxes and less regulation confer a clear cost advantage
on unregistered ﬁrms.
Second, the quality of public goods in our sample is very low. In the
Informal Survey, unregistered ﬁrms report that they experienced power
outages on 50 days of the previous year. Firms in the Enterprise Survey
fare only slightly better (48 days on average). On many days, ﬁrms experi-
ence multiple power outages. For this reason the number of power outages
for the Micro Survey is dramatically higher than the number of days with-
out power in the Informal Survey: unregistered ﬁrms in the Micro survey
experienced 167.1 power outages in the previous year. Once again, Enter-
prise Survey ﬁrms do only marginally better (143.7 outages). In such an
environment, only ﬁrms large enough to afford a generator can be produc-
tive. Outages of water, phones, and transportation are less frequent than
power outages but nevertheless very common by the standards of devel-
oped countries. As a result, the performance of ﬁrms that are too small to
provide substitutes for these public goods (their own transportation equip-
ment, for example) may be severely impaired.
Third, outright theft is very prevalent in our sample, but small ﬁrms do
not make much use of police or the courts. Theft affects all small ﬁrms, not
just unregistered ones. Speciﬁcally, unregistered ﬁrms in the Informal Sur-
vey report that, in a typical year, losses from theft amount to 2.9 percent of
annual sales. Registered ﬁrms in the same survey and small ﬁrms in the
Enterprise Survey report even higher losses (3.5 percent and 3.8 percent,
respectively). Somewhat surprisingly, losses as a result of theft appear to be
lower for Micro Survey ﬁrms (0.5 percent) than for small ﬁrms in the con-
trol group (2.6 percent). To put these ﬁgures in context, note that Enterprise
Survey respondents estimate losses as a result of theft equal to 0.54 percent
of sales in Germany, 0.26 percent in Ireland, and 0.22 percent in Spain.
In response to theft, firms in our sample spend heavily on security and
make “protection” payments to gangsters. For example, security and pro-
316 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 316tection payments equal, respectively, 1.8 and 1.0 percent of the sales of
unregistered ﬁrms in the Informal Survey sample. Firms in their control
group spend a bit more on security and a bit less on protection, but their
total expenditure is similar (3 percent). The police do not appear to play a
central role in addressing theft. In fact, most theft is not even reported to
the police. Only 14.1 percent of incidents suffered by unregistered firms
in the Informal Survey were reported to the police. Registered ﬁrms in the
same survey reported 26.2 percent of incidents—still a low ﬁgure. This
pattern is consistent with the view that unregistered ﬁrms may have trouble
protecting their property rights. Alternatively, the absolute value of the
losses suffered by unregistered firms may be too low to justify filing a
police complaint. Firm size does play a role in reporting theft to the police.
However, even big ﬁrms in the control group for the Informal Survey sam-
ple report to the police only about half of theft incidents (54.0 percent).
Interestingly, small firms do not make much use of the courts to adju-
dicate disputes either. Only 29.2 percent of unregistered and 33.2 percent
of registered ﬁrms in the Micro Survey sample used the courts to resolve
commercial disputes during the previous year. In the control group, the use
of the courts to solve commercial disputes rises quickly with ﬁrm size,
from 51.3 percent for small ﬁrms to 81.8 percent for big ﬁrms. Surprisingly,
the courts appear to work in a reasonably efﬁcient manner. It takes roughly
62 days to resolve a commercial dispute in the Informal Survey countries
and approximately 52 days in the Micro Survey countries. These ﬁgures are
in line with the average length of court proceedings in Germany (35 days),
Ireland (79 days), and Spain (91 days). The fact that unregistered ﬁrms and
small firms in the control group behave similarly in solving commercial
disputes suggests that inadequate access to courts is unlikely to explain
differences in productivity between the two groups of firms. The same
argument applies to lack of police protection.
The tentative picture that emerges from this section is inconsistent
with the romantic view. Unregistered firms have been around for a long
time (7 to 10 years on average), but their sales are still trivially small.
Moreover, few registered ﬁrms started out unregistered. The small size of
unregistered firms is symptomatic of uneducated management and low-
quality assets. When public goods are unreliable, unregistered firms are
too small to afford substitutes such as generators, computers, or trans-
portation equipment. They do not have large ﬁrms as clients. They do not
export. Despite de Soto’s emphasis on access to credit as the key to ignit-
ing the growth of unregistered ﬁrms, lack of external ﬁnance appears to be
an attribute of all small ﬁrms in poor countries, not just of unregistered
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 317
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severe than acknowledged by proponents of the romantic view.
Productivity of Unregistered Firms
In this section we examine the productivity of unregistered ﬁrms and pre-
sent the key ﬁndings of the paper. In measuring the productivity of these
ﬁrms, we face severe data limitations. In particular, we lack information on
how much capital these ﬁrms have. The Informal and Micro questionnaires
do not collect such information, since unregistered entrepreneurs typically
lack detailed records to estimate the value of their assets. We thus have to
measure productivity without capital.
To this end we use two crude measures of productivity: sales per
employee and (gross) value added per employee, the latter deﬁned as sales
net of expenditure on raw materials and energy.
37 Thus, we deﬁne value
added per employee for ﬁrm i in industry s as
where PsiYsi is the level of sales, PmMsi is expenditure on raw materials,
PEEsi is expenditure on energy, and Lsi is the number of employees (includ-
ing both full- and part-time but not seasonal workers). To the extent that
seasonal employment is more prevalent in unregistered ﬁrms than in the
formal sector, we overstate the productivity of unregistered ﬁrms. We use
expenditure on production inputs (such as energy) as a crude proxy for
capital invested.
This approach to productivity measurement has recently received con-
siderable criticism, since the sales measure obviously combines physical
output and prices. But in a competitive equilibrium, prices may vary
inversely with efﬁciency exactly to eliminate any variation in productivity
as measured by sales (or value added) per employee. The recognition of
this problem in the absence of firm-specific price indices is credited to
Tor Jakob Klette and Zvi Griliches;
38 several more recent studies seek to
address the problem.
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37. Data on wages are unavailable for most countries in the Informal sample. For this
reason we are unable to remove labor costs from our measure of value added.
38. Klette and Griliches (1996).
39. These include Bernard and others (2003); Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2006); Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 318Peter Klenow,40 which assumes that all ﬁrms in an industry use the same
Cobb-Douglas production technology and that industry output is a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregate of the outputs of all the ﬁrms.
They then show that, in a competitive equilibrium, physical productivity Asi
(or real output per employee) can be estimated from nominal sales using
the following formula:
where κs is an unobserved constant and σ is the elasticity of substitution of
output. Although we do not observe κs, relative productivities are unaffected
by setting κs equal to 1 for each industry s. Intuitively, goods sold by very
productive ﬁrms must command lower prices to induce buyers to demand
the higher output. Raising sales to the power σ/(σ−1) yields Ysi, making
it possible to infer real output from nominal revenue. Since registered
ﬁrms tend to have higher sales, productivity differences between registered
and unregistered ﬁrms are increasing in σ. Empirically, estimates of σ
range from 3 to 10. We follow Hsieh and Klenow and conservatively set
σ equal to 3.
41
Before turning to the results, we note the empirical ﬁnding of Lucia Foster
and coauthors that the correlation between the sales-based and the corrected
measures of productivity is incredibly high, well over 0.9.
42 Thus, although
the theoretical objection to the traditional measures is compelling, its
empirical signiﬁcance appears minor. Indeed, Foster and coauthors have
data on both prices and sales. The correlation that they report between
nominal and real output is based on actual data rather than on a model.
Measurement Error
Even aside from the theoretical concerns, we need to deal with the fact
that our sales numbers come from unofﬁcial ﬁrms, raising concerns about
measurement error. There is good reason to worry that our productivity
measures may be biased, since unregistered entrepreneurs may choose to
hide output not only from the government but also from the World Bank
contractors. For example, Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie, and Christo-
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41. Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
42. Foster and others (2008).
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 319to researchers, although they attribute this more to lack of recall than to
intentional understatement.
43
We offer two pieces of evidence that support the view that such biases
are unlikely to drive our main results. First, table 11 shows the available
information regarding expenditure on various production inputs (scaled
by sales). If unregistered entrepreneurs lied only about sales, inputs as a
fraction of sales would be higher for unregistered ﬁrms than for other ﬁrms.
In fact, expenditure on raw materials by small ﬁrms in the control group is
12.7 percentage points higher than for unregistered ﬁrms in the Informal
sample, and 2.7 percentage points higher than for unregistered ﬁrms in the
Micro sample. Moreover, expenditure on energy by unregistered firms is
comparable to that by firms in the control group. Other variables show a
mixed pattern. In particular, expenditure on labor by small firms in the
control group is 8.1 percentage points higher than that by unregistered
ﬁrms in the Informal sample, but 1.7 percentage points lower than that by
unregistered ﬁrms in the Micro sample. Similarly, expenditure on machines
by small ﬁrms in the control group is 14.8 percentage points higher than that
by unregistered ﬁrms in the Micro sample, but equal to that by unregistered
ﬁrms in the Informal sample. Finally, there is weak evidence that unregis-
tered ﬁrms in the Informal Survey spend more on rent than do small ﬁrms
in the control group. In sum, there is no evidence that unregistered ﬁrms
consistently spend a larger fraction of their sales on inputs than do small
ﬁrms in the control group, as would be the case if unregistered entrepre-
neurs lied only about their sales.
Second, table 12 shows the available data on wages per employee. Under
the dual hypothesis, unregistered firms should pay low wages.
44 These
low wages may be consistent with some on-the-job home production by
workers in unregistered firms. Alternatively, workers in these firms may
be less skilled than those in registered ﬁrms. Either way, the dual view pre-
dicts that the measured output of unregistered ﬁrms should be low relative
to that of workers in the control group. In contrast, wages in the formal and
informal sectors should be comparable if observed differences in produc-
tivity are due only to measurement error. The top panel of table 12 shows
wages per employee in Cape Verde, the only country in the Informal sam-
ple with wage data. The bottom panel shows wages per employee for the
countries covered by the Micro sample. Wages in both panels are scaled by
income per capita.
320 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
43. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2007).
44. Harris and Todaro (1970).






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 322Three facts stand out. First, there is no clear correlation between ﬁrm
size and wages within the control group. Big ﬁrms pay higher wages than
do small ﬁrms in Congo and Tanzania. The reverse is true in Angola. On
average, wages in big and small ﬁrms are essentially indistinguishable from
each other. Second, unregistered ﬁrms consistently pay lower wages than
do small ﬁrms in the control group. Cape Verde illustrates this point. Wages
in unregistered ﬁrms there are 10 percent lower than income per capita. In
contrast, wages in the control group of small ﬁrms are 2.92 times income
per capita. On average, in the Micro sample, wages are 1.90 times income
per capita in unregistered ﬁrms and 3.75 times income per capita in small
firms in the control group. Third, although there is considerable hetero-
geneity across countries, the workers of unregistered firms are not the
poorest among the poor. In India, for example, wages for the employees of
unregistered ﬁrms exceed GDP per capita by 31 percent. Similarly, in the
Micro sample, the average wage of unregistered workers is roughly twice
GDP per capita. Taken at face value, the large wedge in wages between
unregistered ﬁrms and the control group is strongly consistent with the dual
view of unregistered ﬁrms. Of course, we cannot rule out the alternative
interpretation that respondents shrewdly lie to the World Bank about sales,
inputs, and wages. However, the ﬁndings on inputs and wages should allay
some of the concerns regarding data quality.
As a ﬁnal point, it seems to us that concerns about intentional understate-
ment of revenues should not be exaggerated for our data. Firms participating
in the surveys do so voluntarily. Virtually all of them answer questions about
sales, even though they do not have to. They also give answers suggesting
massive underpayment of taxes and bribe payments by “ﬁrms like theirs.”
This is not the behavior one would expect of those fearful that World Bank
contractors will turn them in (or that the authorities would do anything about
it if they did). Our view is that most informal ﬁrms operate in the open, that
they have done so for years, that they pay the police and other authorities to
leave them alone, and that fear of reprisals for truly reporting revenues to the
World Bank is very far from most of their minds. This particular concern is
a rich-country fear rather than a poor-country reality.
Productivity of Unregistered Firms
Tables 13 and 14 present the main ﬁndings of the paper. Table 13 shows
estimates of log value added (top panel), log sales per employee (middle
panel), and log real output per employee (bottom panel) for the Informal
sample and its Enterprise Survey control group. Table 14 shows analogous
data for the Micro sample. Three key facts stand out. First, registered
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 323






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 327firms in both the Informal and the Micro Surveys are more productive than
unregistered ones in the same survey. Firms in India in the 2006 Micro
Survey illustrate this pattern. Value added per employee for registered ﬁrms
is 35 percent higher than for unregistered ﬁrms (8.40 versus 8.05), sales
per employee are 46 percent higher (9.12 versus 8.66), and real output per
employee is 92 percent higher (14.68 versus 13.76). Most countries exhibit
a similar pattern, although Burundi, Mauritania, Niger, and Pakistan are
exceptions. On average, value added per employee for registered firms
in the Informal and Micro samples is, respectively, 18 percent and 39 per-
cent higher than for their unregistered counterparts. Differences in sales per
employee are even larger: 38 percent for the Informal sample and 59 per-
cent for the Micro sample. Differences between unregistered and registered
ﬁrms are most extreme for real output per employee: 71 percent in the
Informal Survey sample and 98 percent in the Micro Survey sample.
Second, these differences become much more dramatic when we com-
pare Informal or Micro Survey ﬁrms with the Enterprise Survey ﬁrms. The
productivity gap between unregistered ﬁrms and even the small ﬁrms in
the control groups is truly enormous. Take the case of India in 2006 again.
Value added per employee for small Enterprise Survey ﬁrms is 70 percent
higher than for unregistered Micro Survey ﬁrms, and sales and real output
per employee for small firms are 113 percent and 157 percent higher,
respectively, than for unregistered ones. The example of India is represen-
tative of the results for other countries, except that value added and real
output per employee in Burundi and sales per employee in Indonesia do
not conform to this pattern. Bearing in mind that the observations are
unevenly distributed across size groups (only two small ﬁrms in Indonesia
have nonmissing sales), the consistency of the results across countries is
striking. On average, based on the Informal sample, the productivity of
small firms in the Enterprise Survey is around 154, 180, or 314 percent
higher than for unregistered ﬁrms depending on whether we look at value
added, sales per employee, or real output per employee, respectively.
Similarly, based on the Micro sample, the productivity wedge between
small firms in the Enterprise Survey and unregistered firms is 104, 124,
or 234 percent depending on whether we look at value added, sales per
employee, or real output per employee, respectively.
Third, big ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more productive than small ones. Con-
tinuing with the example of India in 2006, the productivity wedge between
big and small ﬁrms in the control group for the Micro sample is 68 percent
for value added, 35 percent for sales per employee, and 271 percent for
real output per employee. This large heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity is
328 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 328consistent with work by Hsieh and Klenow showing sizable gaps in the
marginal products of labor and capital across plants within narrowly deﬁned
industries in China and India.
45 On average, depending on the measure and
the sample, productivity of big ﬁrms is between 59 and 280 percent higher
than that of small ones.
The cumulative effect of these productivity differences is large. Return-
ing to the example of India in 2006, big ﬁrms are 139 to 428 percent more
productive than unregistered ﬁrms. On average, the productivity wedge
between big and unregistered ﬁrms in the Informal sample is 212 percent
for value added, 243 percent for sales per employee, and 575 percent for
real output per employee. The numbers for the Micro sample are of the same
order of magnitude: 171 percent for value added, 209 percent for sales per
employee, and 519 percent for real output per employee.
To illustrate what these differences in productivity mean in practice,
consider the average unregistered Micro Survey ﬁrm in India. It has sales
of $2,420 per employee and value added of $1,279 per employee. In
contrast, an average small ﬁrm in the control group has sales of $12,285
per employee and value added of $4,335 per employee. If the unregistered
ﬁrm could achieve the value added of a small Enterprise Survey ﬁrm sim-
ply by registering, would it choose to do that? By assumption, changing
its legal status would generate $3,056 (= $4,335 − $1,279) in additional
cash ﬂow per employee. However, the ﬁrm would have to pay registration
fees and taxes as well as comply with regulations. The registration fee—
including the value of the entrepreneurs’ time—would probably amount to
roughly $400.
46 The firm would also need to pay labor taxes (17 percent
of wages), corporate taxes (35 percent of profits), and value-added taxes
(12.5 percent of proﬁts).
47 Recall that our value-added estimates are based
on expenditure on energy and materials and do not exclude labor costs. To
keep things simple, assume that wages are 20 percent of sales ($2,457) and
that there are no additional costs. Moreover, to bias the example against
the firm choosing to register, assume that the firm would evade all taxes
if unregistered but comply fully if registered. Under these assumptions,
the ﬁrm would owe additional payments of $418 (= 0.17 × $2,457) in labor
taxes, $657 in corporate taxes (= 0.35 × [$4,335 − $2,457]), and value-
added tax of $235 (= 0.125 × [$4,335 − $2,457]), for a total of $1,710 per
employee in taxes and fees. In this back-of-the-envelope calculation, the
ﬁrm would pocket $1,346 (= $3,056 − $1,710) per employee by registering.
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45. Hsieh and Klenow (2007).
46. Djankov and others (2002).
47. Djankov and others (2008b).
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merely by registering, replicate the value added per employee of big ﬁrms
in the control group. On average, such ﬁrms have value added per employee
of $8,715 on sales per employee of $20,301. Calculations similar to the
preceding ones suggest that the unregistered ﬁrm would gain $4,135 per
employee if, simply by registering, it could replicate the value added per
employee of big ﬁrms.
A similar set of calculations illustrates that unregistered entrepreneurs
can simply not afford to pay taxes unless sales sharply increase from merely
registering. Assuming wages equal 20 percent of sales ($484), the average
unregistered ﬁrm has a pre-tax proﬁt per employee of $795 (=$1,279 −$484)
and owes taxes of $460 per employee.
48 Unless sales dramatically increased
as a result of registering, the average unregistered ﬁrm would have consid-
erable difﬁculty paying $400 to register.
In practice, these calculations mean that believers in the romantic view
need to blame the precarious existence of unregistered ﬁrms on something
beyond costly entry procedures and high tax rates. Given the very large dif-
ference in productivity between unregistered ﬁrms and the control group, the
cost of complying with government regulations would have to be implausi-
bly high to justify operating as an unregistered ﬁrm. A more realistic sce-
nario is that—consistent with the dual view—unregistered ﬁrms would not
be able to achieve the performance of small ﬁrms in the control group just
by registering. Perhaps, for example, unregistered ﬁrms lack the human
capital necessary to match the quality of the goods produced by formal
ﬁrms. The image of unregistered ﬁrms that is consistent with their observed
productivity is not that of predators but rather that of relics of the past.
What accounts for the large difference in productivity between unregis-
tered ﬁrms and the control group? We begin by running simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions and discuss self-selection issues later. In
principle, the productivity differences that we document in tables 13 and 14
could be driven by industry effects, by differences in inputs (including
human capital), or by differences in size. The goal of these regressions is to
examine whether unregistered ﬁrms remain unusually unproductive after
we control for these factors. In simple terms, we interpret the estimated
coefficient on the unregistered dummy as a measure of our ignorance
regarding the production function of unregistered firms. Omitting the
unregistered dummy would not mean that unregistered ﬁrms are as pro-
330 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
48. Such a ﬁrm would owe $82 in labor taxes (= 0.17 × $484), $278 in corporate taxes
(= 0.35 × [$1,279 − $484]), and $99 in value-added taxes (= 0.125 × [$1,279 − $484]).
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 330ductive as registered ones, but that differences in productivity are captured
by differences in inputs, as in Rauch’s selection story.
49
All speciﬁcations include dummy variables equaling 1 under the fol-
lowing conditions: the ﬁrm is in the Informal Survey; the ﬁrm is registered
and in the Informal Survey; the ﬁrm is in the Micro Survey; and the ﬁrm is
registered and in the Micro Survey. Firms in the Enterprise Survey are the
omitted category. We then add to the regression—one at a time—log
income per capita, eight industry dummies, expenditure on raw materials,
expenditure on energy, expenditure on machines, the index of manager
education, and log sales.
50 All three expenditure variables are scaled by the
number of employees.
Table 15 reports the results of OLS regressions in which log value added
per employee is the dependent variable. Tables 16 and 17 show similar
regressions for log sales and real output per employee, respectively. All three
sets of results are qualitatively similar. We discuss the ﬁndings on value
added in some detail and point out where the results for sales and real output
per employee differ. The ﬁrst regression reported in each table includes as
independent variables only the dummies for whether the ﬁrm is in the
Informal Survey sample or in the Micro Survey sample and the interactions
between each of those two variables and whether the ﬁrm is registered.
The results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in tables 13 and 14. The estimated coef-
ﬁcients in column 15-1 of table 15 are −1.78 for the Informal sample
dummy and −1.29 for the Micro sample dummy. The coefficients for
the interactions of the Informal and the Micro dummies with whether the
ﬁrm is registered equal 0.81 and 0.35, respectively. All four dummies are
highly statistically signiﬁcant. Adding GDP per capita to the regression
(column 15-2) does not change the basic pattern. Similarly, the estimated
coefﬁcients for the four dummies barely change as we add industry con-
trols (column 15-3). The coefﬁcients do change when we add expenditure
on raw materials: the estimated coefﬁcients for each of the four dummies are
roughly cut in half (column 15-4). Adding expenditure on energy further
lowers the estimated coefﬁcients on the four dummies, but not signiﬁcantly
(column 15-5). The four coefﬁcients barely change as we add expenditure
on machinery (column 15-6). The coefficients for expenditure on raw
materials, energy, and machines are not only statistically signiﬁcant but
also economically important. For example, increasing raw materials by
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 331
49. Rauch (1991).
50. Errors are clustered at the country level. We do not include country ﬁxed effects
since the frequency of unregistered ﬁrms in our sample may not reﬂect the incidence of
unregistered ﬁrms in the population.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 3341 standard deviation is associated with a 43 percent increase in value
added per employee.
51 Similar increases in expenditure on energy and
machines have somewhat smaller effects (32 and 16 percent, respectively).
Coefﬁcients fall another notch when we add manager education to the
regression (column 15-7). Interestingly, ignoring selection issues, the esti-
mated coefﬁcient on manager education suggests that a top manager with
some college education increases value added per employee by 27 percent
(= 0.09 × 3) relative to a top manager with only some primary school edu-
cation. Finally, there is no evidence that unregistered ﬁrms are unusually
unproductive once we control for log sales: the estimated coefﬁcients on
both the Informal and the Micro dummies switch signs when we add log
sales to the regression (column 15-8). In fact, the coefﬁcient on the Micro
dummy is not only positive but also signiﬁcant. The interaction between
the registration dummy and the Informal dummy is the only interaction
term that remains statistically signiﬁcant.
Again, the results on sales and real output per employee (tables 16
and 17, respectively) are very similar to those for value added. In the full
speciﬁcation, the estimated coefﬁcients for both the Informal and the
Micro dummies are positive and signiﬁcant. The interaction between the
registered and the Informal dummies is insigniﬁcant, whereas that between
the registered and the Micro dummies takes a small—but statistically
signiﬁcant—negative value.
Selection
The OLS results in this section suggest that unregistered firms are not
unusually unproductive once we take into account their expenditure on
inputs, the human capital of their top managers, and their small size. Of
course, these are all endogenous variables. In fact, a key distinguishing
factor between the dual view and the other views of unregistered ﬁrms is
the emphasis on the sorting process that matches able managers with good
assets. High-quality managers are willing to pay taxes and bear the cost of
government regulation in exchange for being able to advertise their prod-
ucts, raise outside capital, and access public goods. In contrast, low-quality
managers avoid taxes and regulations, since the beneﬁts of operating in the
formal economy are less valuable for small ﬁrms.
Table 18 examines the sorting process. Specifically, we examine the
relationship between the quality of the ﬁrm’s assets and the human capital
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 335
51. The standard deviations for raw materials, energy, and machines are 2.11, 1.66, and
2.83, respectively.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 337of its top manager—our only proxy for managers’ ability. The depen-
dent variables fall into two categories: dummy variables (top panel, which
reports probit regressions) and continuous variables (bottom panel, OLS
regressions). The dummy variables include indicators for whether the
firm is registered; the firm has ever had a loan; the firm’s main cus-
tomers are large firms; the firm occupies a permanent structure; the firm
is located in the owner’s house; the firm owns the building it occupies;
the firm owns the land it occupies; the firm uses its own transportation
equipment; the firm owns a generator; the firm uses e-mail to communi-
cate with clients; the firm uses a website to communicate with clients;
and the firm has an electrical connection. The five continuous variables
are the percentage of investment that is financed internally; expenditure
on raw materials as a fraction of sales; expenditure on energy as a fraction
of sales; expenditure on machines as a fraction of sales; and capacity
utilization. All regressions control for income per capita and include
eight industry dummies.
Many—but not all—of the correlations in table 18 are consistent with
sorting on managers’ ability. Firms with more-educated managers are
more likely to be registered, to sell mainly to large ﬁrms, to use their own
transportation equipment, to own a generator, to communicate with clients
through e-mail, to have a webpage, and to have an electrical connection.
Along the same lines, managers who attended college are more likely to
work for ﬁrms that own land and buildings. Firms with more-educated
managers also use more raw materials and operate with higher capacity
utilization. The economic signiﬁcance of these coefﬁcients is large. The
probability of being registered increases by 41 percentage points if the top
manager has some college education rather than only some primary school
education. Having a top manager with some college education also has large
effects on the probability of having a generator (+36.7 percentage points),
the probability of using e-mail (+48.0 percentage points), the probability of
having a webpage (+25.7 percentage points), and the probability of having
an electrical connection (+28.3 percentage points). In contrast, the effect is
moderate on the probability that the ﬁrm’s main buyers are large ﬁrms
(+3.2 percentage points), the probability of owning a building (+11.2 per-
centage points), the probability of owning land (+9.8 percentage points),
and the probability of owning transportation equipment (+11.8 percentage
points). Similarly, having a top manager with some college education
increases expenditure on raw materials by a modest 8.7 percentage points
(the standard deviation is 23.3 percent) and capacity utilization by 5.5 per-
centage points (the standard deviation is 21.4 percent).
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 338The evidence on external ﬁnance is mixed. On the one hand, ﬁrms with
more-educated managers rely more on external ﬁnance (bottom panel of
table 18). On the other hand, the education of managers does not signiﬁ-
cantly affect the probability that the ﬁrm has ever had a loan (top panel).
The evidence on investment in machines is also weak: in that regression the
only signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is the one for vocational schooling. Nor is there
evidence that expenditure on energy increases with managers’ education.
Only one regression has statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients with the “wrong”
sign: the likelihood that the ﬁrm operates in the house of the owner is higher
when managers have attended secondary or vocational school rather than
primary school only.
These results suggest an explanation for the puzzlingly low productivity
of unregistered ﬁrms. The productivity gap between registered ﬁrms and
the control group disappears once we take into account crude proxies for
physical and human capital and control for size. Of course, size is an
endogenous variable. These results on manager selection are broadly con-
sistent with the view that part of the reason that unregistered ﬁrms are small
is that they are run by managers of low ability.
52 These managers do not
ﬁnd it worthwhile to pay the cost of running a formal ﬁrm. Unregistered
ﬁrms are small because they are run by less able managers and, as such,
face a high cost of capital, have few opportunities to advertise their prod-
ucts, and are of insufﬁcient scale to own critical assets such as generators
and computers.
Obstacles to Doing Business
As a ﬁnal step, we present information on obstacles to doing business as
reported by respondents in the Informal, Micro, and Enterprise Surveys.
All obstacles are reported on a 0-to-4 scale for their perceived signiﬁcance,
with 0 representing “no obstacle,” 1 “minor obstacle,” 2 “moderate obsta-
cle,” 3 “major obstacle,” and 4 “very severe obstacle.” In table 19 we com-
pare average responses about various obstacles for Informal Survey ﬁrms
(top panel) and their Enterprise Survey counterparts, as well as for Micro
Survey ﬁrms and their control group (bottom panel).
Starting with the Informal Survey, the most striking ﬁnding is the simi-
larity in many responses between the registered Informal Survey ﬁrms and
the Enterprise Survey ﬁrms. Both groups consider tax rates and tax admin-
istration their most signiﬁcant problems. Registered Informal Survey ﬁrms,
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 339
52. Rauch (1991).

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 341like Enterprise Survey ﬁrms, regard the cost of ﬁnancing and access to
ﬁnancing as major obstacles as well. Neither the Informal Survey ﬁrms nor
the Enterprise Survey ﬁrms consider access to land, registration procedures,
crime, low workforce skills, labor regulations (with the exception of big
ﬁrms), or the legal system to be major obstacles to doing business (again
with the exception of big ﬁrms).
There are some signiﬁcant differences as well. Informal Survey ﬁrms
consider access to or availability of markets to be a huge problem. The
unregistered Informal Survey ﬁrms do not consider taxes or tax adminis-
tration to be a huge problem, in obvious contrast to the registered ﬁrms.
Corruption is a smaller problem for the unregistered ﬁrms than for the reg-
istered ones. Indeed, both tax administration and corruption are perceived
as more serious obstacles by big ﬁrms than by small ones (but only differ-
ences in the perception of tax administration as an obstacle are statistically
signiﬁcant).
We can also use the information on obstacles to shed light on the para-
site theory of the informal economy. Unfortunately, the question asked in
the surveys is not ideal. Respondents assess on a 0-to-4 scale whether
“anticompetitive and informal practices” are an obstacle to their business.
Of course, anticompetitive practices can come not only from the informal
firms, but also from formal firms with political or other connections.
Nevertheless, several points emerge from these data. First, contrary to the
parasite view, “anticompetitive and informal” practices are not among the
key obstacles perceived by managers of ﬁrms in either the Informal Survey
ﬁrms (the average score is 1.78) or their Enterprise Survey control group
(1.94).
53 Second, the answer is only slightly higher for the Enterprise
Survey ﬁrms than for the Informal Survey ﬁrms, which is not consistent
with the view that the informal ﬁrms undercut the formal ones. Third, one
might have guessed that it is the small registered ﬁrms in the Enterprise
Survey that would be most severely affected by the informal ﬁrms. How-
ever, these ﬁrms perceive anticompetitive and informal practices to be a
smaller problem, on average, than do the larger ﬁrms. None of this evidence
is supportive of the parasite theory. The patterns in the Micro Survey are
similar to those in the Informal Survey (except that some of the questions
differ). Access to ﬁnancing and electricity emerge as by far the greatest
342 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
53. Among big ﬁrms, concern over “anticompetitive or informal practices” ranks after
concerns over tax rates, tax administration, cost of ﬁnancing, corruption, macroeconomic
instability, and electricity. On the other hand, it ranks ahead of, among other things, con-
cerns over economic policy uncertainty, customs and trade regulations, access to ﬁnancing,
and crime, theft, and disorder.
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 342obstacles to Micro Survey ﬁrms. These are also huge obstacles for their
counterpart Enterprise Survey firms, along with tax rates. Finally, anti-
competitive and informal practices are not among the top obstacles for
ﬁrms in the Micro Survey.
A ﬁnal piece of evidence comes from the Informal Survey, which only
in Cape Verde asked respondents about the beneﬁts of and obstacles to
registering. The ﬁndings are summarized in table 20. The main beneﬁts of
registering are improved access to markets, to services, and to ﬁnancing—
ﬁndings broadly consistent with the previous ﬁndings about the obstacles
to doing business faced by informal ﬁrms. Better property rights and lower
need to pay bribes are not nearly as important. On the cost side, the main
obstacles to registration are taxes and the cost of registering (along with
RAFAEL LA PORTA and ANDREI SHLEIFER 343
Table 20. Advantages and Obstacles to Registering in Cape Verde
Percent of ﬁrms rating the 
advantage as very important 
or the obstacle as either major 
Advantage or obstacle or extremely importanta
Advantages
Better access to markets 44
Better access to services 39
Better access to ﬁnancing 39
Better access to raw materials 34
Easier to bargain with formal enterprises 25
Easier to reduce theft by employees or others 23
Better access to government subsidies 20
More solid legal basis for property rights regarding 20
real estate
Less turnover of employees or better product market 18
competition
Less need to pay bribes 15
Obstacles
Financial burden of taxes applicable to registered ﬁrms 43
Cost of registering 38
Difﬁculties in obtaining information about how 36
to register
Minimum capital legally required to register 32
Administrative burden of complying with tax laws 32
Time necessary to register 19
Labor regulations applicable to registered ﬁrms 19
Other administrative burdens 18
Sources: World Bank Informal Survey for Cape Verde; authors’ calculations.
a. Advantages are rated on a scale from 1 (“minor advantage”) to 4 (“very important”). Obstacles are
rated on a 0-to-4 scale, with 0 indicating “unimportant,” 1 “minor obstacle,” 2 “moderate obstacle,” 
3 “major obstacle,” and 4 “extremely important.”
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 343the difﬁculty of obtaining information about how to register). Labor regu-
lation and tax compliance are seen as much less important. Here as well,
the picture that emerges is one in which the formal ﬁrms have better access
to markets, services, and ﬁnance, and hence can be much more productive,
but need to pay taxes. Presumably, for the Cape Verde ﬁrms in the Infor-
mal Survey, the tax price is too high to justify registration.
The evidence on obstacles further supports the dual theory and seems
rather inconsistent with the parasite theory. Between their extreme inefﬁ-
ciency and their operation in very different markets, informal firms do
not appear to pose much of a threat to formal firms, at least as perceived
by the latter. Informal firms clearly recognize the many benefits of being
official, including access to markets and to finance (although it is far
from clear that they would gain the latter even if they registered). They
do not seem to think that regulation and the cost of registration are the
biggest obstacles to registration. On the other hand, they do see taxes as
a huge problem. In this respect the results are consistent with the dual




Our most basic ﬁnding is that high productivity comes from formal ﬁrms,
and in particular from large formal ﬁrms. Productivity is much higher in
small formal ﬁrms than in informal ﬁrms, and it rises rapidly with the size
of formal ﬁrms. To the extent that productivity growth is central to eco-
nomic development, the formation and growth of formal ﬁrms are neces-
sary for economic growth.
55
Formal ﬁrms appear to be very different animals from informal ﬁrms,
and this fact accounts for their sharply superior productivity. Perhaps most
important, they are run by much better educated managers. As a conse-
quence, besides being larger, they tend to use more capital, have different
customers, and market their products and use external ﬁnance to a greater
extent than do informal ﬁrms. There is no evidence that informal ﬁrms
tend to become formal as they grow. Rather, virtually none of the formal
ﬁrms in our sample had ever been informal. Consistent with this result,
Miriam Bruhn shows that business registration reform had a large effect on
new registrations in Mexico, but that the new ofﬁcial entrants were former
344 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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55. See also Lewis (2004); Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005).
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Vélez and Peña-Parga find surprisingly little transition between self-
employment and business ownership in Colombia.
57 It does not appear
from the available evidence that informal ﬁrms would sharply increase their
productivity if only they registered.
This interpretation raises the crucial question of what happens to infor-
mal ﬁrms as the economy develops. After all, the most basic fact about the
informal economy is that its role diminishes sharply as incomes grow.
How does this happen? Do informal firms register or do they die? We do
not have a definitive answer to this question, but the evidence we have
points in the direction of death rather than registration. It is still possible,
of course, that a minority of informal ﬁrms, and especially the most produc-
tive ones, end up joining the formal economy, perhaps by supplying formal
ﬁrms. But there is no evidence, at least in our data, that this is the typical
story. The vast majority of informal ﬁrms appear to begin and end their
lives as unproductive informal ﬁrms.
Informal ﬁrms nonetheless play a crucial role in developing economies,
where they represent perhaps 30 to 40 percent of all economic activity and
provide a livelihood to billions of poor people. Because these ﬁrms are so
inefﬁcient, taxing them or forcing them to comply with government regula-
tions would likely put most of them out of business, with dire consequences
for their employees and proprietors. If anything, strategies that keep these
ﬁrms aﬂoat and allow them to become more productive, such as micro-
ﬁnance, are probably desirable from the viewpoint of poverty alleviation.
But these are not growth strategies: turning these unofﬁcial ﬁrms into ofﬁ-
cial ones is unlikely to generate substantial improvements in productivity.
Growth strategies, rather, need to focus on formal ﬁrms, especially the
larger ones. Reducing the costs of formality, such as registration costs,
is surely a good idea, but this is not the whole story. Likewise, some of
the almost-standard proposals for development, such as improving land
rights, the legal environment, and even the human capital of employees
appear to address relatively minor factors, at least from the viewpoint of
ofﬁcial entrepreneurs. The main obstacles to the operations of formal ﬁrms,
according to our data, are three: taxation, uncertain supply of electricity,
and lack of adequate access to ﬁnance.
To us, the most striking ﬁnding is the sharply higher education of man-
agers of ofﬁcial than of unofﬁcial ﬁrms, with no corresponding difference
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policies, particularly those emphasizing secondary education, might be
conducive to the formation of entrepreneurial talent that can run formal
ﬁrms. We do not mean to suggest that formal education is either a necessary
or a sufﬁcient condition for entrepreneurial skills. But the data seem to
indicate quite clearly that some aspects of management (for example, mar-
keting and ﬁnance) require education. One can also think of other sources
of human capital, such as immigration, as supplying the required entrepre-
neurial talent.
There is growing evidence that corporate income taxation deters invest-
ment and formal entrepreneurship. Using a new dataset of corporate income
taxes in a large number of countries, Djankov and coauthors ﬁnd strong
evidence that these taxes reduce investment, foreign direct investment, and
entrepreneurial activity.
58 Our evidence similarly shows that ofﬁcial ﬁrms
perceive taxation as the top obstacle to doing business. To the extent that
the formation and growth of official firms are the principal engines of
development, this perception must be taken seriously. Needless to say, one
needs to also think about alternative sources of public ﬁnance, as well as
the size of government, in developing countries to determine whether cor-
porate income tax cuts are warranted. But the evidence points to a poten-
tially serious problem.
The evidence also suggests that ofﬁcial ﬁrms, just like unofﬁcial ones,
perceive lack of access to ﬁnance to be a serious obstacle to doing business.
Recent research has pointed to a broad range of legal and regulatory
reforms that can underpin the development of ﬁnancial markets; in general
these reforms seek to improve the legal rights of creditors and (in the case
of very large ﬁrms) shareholders.
59 Unlike with tax cuts, there seem to be
no compelling counterarguments to improving the laws and institutions that
support ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, the evidence indicates that problems with electricity supply,
including disruptions, afﬂict unofﬁcial as well as smaller ofﬁcial ﬁrms. This
contrasts with an interesting lack of concern on the part of respondents with
other limitations of infrastructure, such as transport, telephone, and mail.
Most large ﬁrms have their own generators, whereas smaller ofﬁcial ﬁrms
and unofﬁcial ﬁrms do not and hence are more vulnerable.
The overall picture of economic development that emerges from this
analysis is in many ways similar to the traditional pre-growth theory devel-
346 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
58. Djankov and others (2008b).
59. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) for a survey.
11472-06_La Porta_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:13 PM  Page 346opment economics, although it is related to the modern reformulations of
economic growth through the lens of development economics.
60 The recipe
for productivity growth is the formation of ofﬁcial ﬁrms—the larger and
the more productive, the better. Their formation must perhaps be promoted
through tax, human capital, infrastructure, and capital markets policies,
very much along the lines of traditional dual economy theories. From
the perspective of economic growth, one should not expect much from the
unofﬁcial economy, with its millions of entrepreneurs, except to hope that
it disappears over time. This “Wal-Mart” theory of economic development
receives quite a bit of support from ﬁrm-level data.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
CHARLES I. JONES This very nice paper is ﬁlled with interesting facts
about ﬁrms in developing countries: about the size of the informal economy
(around half that of the formal sector, on average); about the extent of theft
among both small and large ﬁrms (less than 5 percent of sales); and about
the number of days per year that ﬁrms face power outages (around 50, even
for large ﬁrms). The tour through the extensive ﬁrm-level surveys across
many countries is itself a valuable contribution. Indeed, but for the expert
guidance provided by the authors, it would be easy to get lost along the way.
Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer helpfully frame their discussion
in terms of three “views” of the informal economy. The romantic view of
Hernando de Soto and others suggests that the informal sector is an engine
of growth just waiting to be released by giving informal ﬁrms property
rights.
1 The parasitic view, associated with the McKinsey Global Institute,2
sees the informal sector as a collection of firms that remain small (and
unproductive) in order to avoid taxes and regulations, which allows them
to inefﬁciently take away market share from more-productive formal ﬁrms.
Finally, the dual economy view, associated with John Harris and Michael
Todaro,
3 among others, suggests that informal ﬁrms are not so much a
threat to formal ﬁrms as a social safety net that provides a livelihood for
millions of very poor, uneducated people. In this view the informal economy
is not so much a drag on development as it is a way station where people can
1. Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World
(New York: Harper and Row, 1989).
2. For example, Martin Baily, Diana Farrell, and Jaana Remes, “Domestic Services: The
Hidden Key to Growth” (Washington: McKinsey Global Institute, 2005).
3. John Harris and Michael Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and Development:
A Two-Sector Analysis,” American Economic Review 60, no. 1 (1970): 126–42.
11472-06b_La Porta Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:16 PM  Page 353wait until development leads to the establishment of additional productive
formal ﬁrms that can provide them with jobs.
After studying a wide range of correlations, facts, and survey responses
in extensive ﬁrm-level surveys, La Porta and Shleifer conclude that the
evidence is most consistent with the dual economy view. The main evidence
against the romantic view is that informal ﬁrms look very different from
formal ones—for example, the managers of informal ﬁrms are much less well
educated—and the authors see very little evidence that growth occurs by
informal ﬁrms eventually becoming large, productive formal establishments.
The main evidence they offer against the parasitic view is that formal ﬁrms
do not view competition from informal ﬁrms as a serious problem; they are
much more concerned with access to markets, access to ﬁnance, and taxes.
A fact that emerges quite clearly from the data is that the informal sector
is very large in the poorest economies and surely provides a kind of social
safety net for many workers. By avoiding taxes and regulations, this sector
can employ people who are not sufﬁciently productive to work in the formal
sector.Giventhatthissectorcanencompassasmuchashalfofthelaborforce,
this is a substantial safety net. A question that naturally follows is whether
or not this is the most effective way of providing it. What is the cost?
The ﬁrm-level surveys and a recent paper by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter
Klenow suggest one way to make progress on this question.
4 Because this
approach also provides some useful insights into the meaning of “value added
per worker,” I will outline a simple story along these lines in what follows.
WHAT DOES VALUE ADDED PER WORKER REALLY MEASURE? A recent and
growing literature emphasizes the need for caution in interpreting measures
of value added per worker, or “labor productivity.” In particular, one seldom
has access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc price deﬂators, so that measures of labor produc-
tivity actually measure revenue per worker rather than a real quantity—
that is, they confound price and quantity.
5 La Porta and Shleifer recognize
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4. Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in
China and India,” Working Paper 13290 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2007).
5. Prominent examples from this literature include the following: Tor Jakob Klette and
Zvi Griliches, “The Inconsistency of Common Scale Estimators When Output Prices Are
Unobserved and Endogenous,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 11, no. 4 (1996): 343–61;
Andrew Bernard and others, “Plants and Productivity in International Trade,” American
Economic Review 93, no. 4 (2003): 1268–90; Hajime Katayama, Shihua Lu, and James Tybout,
“Firm-Level Productivity Studies: Illusions and a Solution” (Penn State University, 2006);
Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson, “Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and
Efﬁciency: Selection on Productivity or Proﬁtability?” American Economic Review 98, no. 1
(2008): 394–425; and Hsieh and Klenow, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China
and India.”
11472-06b_La Porta Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:16 PM  Page 354this in the published version of their paper and do a good job of incorporat-
ing some of the implications. In particular, they employ an insight from
Hsieh and Klenow that says that if one knows the shape of the demand
curve, one can infer price and quantity from revenue.
It is possible, however, to go even further. In particular, although
“revenue labor productivity” is not a quantity measure, it contains very
useful information about the nature of the distortions that affect ﬁrms. One
can use these revenue measures to back out those distortions and consider
the hypothetical question of how much higher output would be in their
absence. To see how this works, consider the following benchmark model,
which is a simpliﬁed version of the framework in Hsieh and Klenow, aug-
mented to include a Harris-Todaro dual economy element.
THE MODEL: WAL-MART VERSUS A TRINKET SHOP. Suppose there are two
highly substitutable goods in the economy: the output of a very productive,
Wal-Mart-likestore,y,andtheoutputofasmallandlessproductiveinformal
trinket shop, x. Each good is produced using only labor. The total quantity of
labor, L –, is ﬁxed and can be either used for production or left unemployed
(u is the endogenous fraction unemployed).
This setup is summarized in the following equations:
Assume that resources are allocated according to perfect competition,
subject to several distortions. First, each sector faces a ﬁrm-speciﬁc sales
tax, at rates τx and τy, respectively. (One can think of the informal sector
facing a tax rate of τx = 0 as a special case.) Second, a combination of min-
imum wage laws and regulations leads to a wedge between the wage in the
formal sector and that in the informal sector, such that the formal sector
wage is 1 + μ times the informal sector wage. This wage differential leads
to queueing for the formal jobs, generating unemployment as in the Harris-
Todaro model.
Proﬁt maximization by the two kinds of ﬁrms ensures that labor is hired
until the after-tax marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage:
() . 21 pA w xx x x − ( ) = τ
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tions for demand and the allocation of labor:
When these equations are combined, the allocation of labor to the formal
and informal sectors satisﬁes
According to equation 5, the informal sector is larger when
—the informal sector faces lower distortions or lower taxes (τx is smaller),
—the formal sector faces higher distortions or higher taxes (τy is larger),
—the wage premium μ in the formal sector is higher, or
—the informal sector is more productive relative to the formal sector
(Ax / Ay is greater).
VALUE ADDED PER WORKER. Now suppose that Wal-Mart-specific and
trinket store–specific price indexes are unavailable, and instead all firms’
revenues are deflated by a common retail sector price deflator. What
does a comparison of “value added per worker” reveal in this case? Recall
the first-order conditions in equations 1 and 2, which can be rearranged
to yield
and
Notice that differences in “revenue” labor productivity across ﬁrms reﬂect
differences in the distortions (τy, τx, μ) and say nothing about differences
in “true” productivity (A). Marginal revenue products are equated across
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11472-06b_La Porta Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:16 PM  Page 356knows this already: more-productive ﬁrms will charge lower prices, so
sales revenue will not reveal which ﬁrm has higher productivity.
I have developed this point in the context of labor productivity. But
exactly the same point applies to multifactor productivity measures.
Although this result is well known at some level, it is also ignored quite
often in studies of ﬁrm-level productivity. One prominent example is the
draft of the La Porta and Shleifer paper presented at the Brookings Panel
conference, but these authors are certainly in extremely good company—
nearly every study of ﬁrm-level productivity until recently likely suffers
from the same criticism.
From this point there are two useful directions in which to proceed. First,
one can seek better price deﬂators or other clever means to recover the true
underlying productivities. Second, one can consider what is to be learned
from revenue labor productivity itself. I will consider each of these in turn.
MEASURING TRUE PRODUCTIVITY. Recovering true productivity requires
some measure of prices. In some (perhaps only a few) cases, such a price
measure can be obtained directly.
6 Alternatively, one can use information
about the demand elasticity to recover prices and quantities from firm
revenue. For example, in the simple model here,
Knowledge of the curvature parameter ρ (or of the elasticity of substitution)
allows one to infer relative quantities. Hsieh and Klenow discuss this second
approach in more detail, and this is the approach followed by La Porta and
Shleifer, for example in the bottom panels of their tables 13 and 14.
An interesting and surprising ﬁnding that seems to be emerging from
this literature—it is a feature in the La Porta and Shleifer paper as well as
in others
7—is that revenue labor productivity and “true” labor productivity
are highly correlated. That is, even though there is no reason a priori to
expect revenue labor productivity to provide any information about true
labor productivity, the two seem to be closely related. One interpretation of
this—explored in the next section—is that revenue labor productivity
reveals something important about the pattern of distortions, namely, that
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6. This is the approach taken in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, “Reallocation, Firm
Turnover, and Efﬁciency.”
7. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, “Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efﬁciency”;
Hsieh and Klenow, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India.”
11472-06b_La Porta Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:16 PM  Page 357nagging worry that it might reﬂect something else, but what exactly it is I
am not sure.
STUDYING DISTORTIONS. As I noted above in discussing equations 6
and 7, even if revenue labor productivity says nothing about true produc-
tivity, it can still be quite informative about the distortions that affect the
allocation of resources. Indeed, the results reported in tables 13 and 14 in
this paper allow one to back out estimates of the distortions faced by ﬁrms.
In particular, the ratio of firms’ revenue labor productivities provides an
estimate of (1 + μ)(1 −τ x) / (1 −τ y). This can be summarized in a measure of
an “effective tax rate”—the tax rate that would apply if all of the distortions
were embodied in τyitself. This effective tax rate is then equal to 1 −(1/RLP),
where RLP denotes the ratio of revenue labor productivity across the
two groups of firms. An example of results of this kind is summarized in
table 1 below.
Apparently, big ﬁrms—which turn out to be the ﬁrms with the highest
“true” productivity—have a marginal revenue product of labor that is
8.33 times that of unregistered ﬁrms. Part of this difference could come from
big ﬁrms employing higher-quality labor; however, table 12 of the paper
shows that big ﬁrms pay only somewhat higher wages than unregistered
ﬁrms and actually pay lower wages than small ﬁrms. Instead, the interpre-
tation suggested by the Hsieh-Klenow approach outlined here is that big
ﬁrms face much larger distortions than unregistered ﬁrms.
The implication is that moving labor from the unregistered sector into
big firms would have a large effect on total output. Hsieh and Klenow
perform calculations along these lines (for China and India) to see by how
much output could be raised if marginal revenue products were equated
across ﬁrms.
A similar calculation could be done using the results in this paper, not
across individual ﬁrms but across groups of ﬁrms: by how much would out-
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Table 1. Effective Tax Rates Faced by Formal Firms





Registered v. unregistered ﬁrms 0.18 1.20 0.17
Small v. unregistered ﬁrms 1.54 4.66 0.79
Big v. unregistered ﬁrms 2.12 8.33 0.88
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. “Average” log difference for value added per employee, in log units, from La Porta and Shleifer, this
volume, table 13.
b. Exponential of the difference in the ﬁrst column.
c. Tax rate on formal ﬁrms that would apply if τx and μ were zero.
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size, and big ﬁrms so as to equate the marginal revenue products? I have
done some simple calculations along these lines, and the results suggest
that output could be increased by a factor of between 3.1 and 3.5 (of which
a factor of 2 comes from the Harris-Todaro distortion associated with μ). A
more careful calculation would be interesting and would help to shed some
light on the important question of how costly it is to use the informal sec-
tor to provide social insurance. If those costs turn out to be high, it would
suggest the need to think about more-efﬁcient ways of providing that
insurance.
COMMENT BY
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS This paper by Rafael La Porta and Andrei
Shleifer discusses the importance of the unofﬁcial economy in economic
development. They emphasize the different views of informal sector ﬁrms in
development economics, but in parallel there has been a growing recognition
of the innovational importance of small or nascent ﬁrms in developed
countries. Work by Hernando de Soto and the awarding of the Nobel Peace
prize to Muhammad Yunus, the founder of microﬁnance, are symptoms of
the view that the smallest economic entities may be crucially important.
To begin, what does one mean by the “unofﬁcial” (or “underground” or
“informal”) economy? I know of at least ﬁve possible deﬁnitions: unlawful
economic activity, activity not reported on ﬁnancial statements, activity not
reported on tax statements, activity not measured in the national accounts,
and activity by businesses not registered with government agencies. The
paper discusses all of these, but I think the last one (or, more speciﬁcally,
activity by businesses not registered with central government agencies)
comes closest to describing the object of their analysis.
It is worth noting that even in the United States, where the data are good
relative to those from developing countries, on which the paper must rely,
most “businesses” are not registered in any meaningful sense. There were
around 30 million tax returns of a business nature in 2005. Perhaps 6 million
of these were from corporations, which would be registered. It is unclear
how many of the other 24 million “businesses” are registered, although
they do ﬁle tax returns. The government estimates that there are 20 million
nonemployer ﬁrms. I would guess that the actual number of unregistered
small businesses with receipts of more than $100 a year is as large as the
number that ﬁle tax returns.
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cial ﬁrms fall into? Most are unlikely to be engaged in unlawful activities,
although the value of illegal drugs (circa $100 billion a year) is not far from
the Internal Revenue Service’s estimate of underreporting on tax returns
(on the order of $130 billion). At the other extreme, most are unlikely to be
required to register with governments. But they are likely to be included in
the national accounts because of the multiple sourcing and imputations.
It is not clear to me that the unofficial economies discussed in the paper
are any larger in proportion to their national economies than the unofﬁcial
economy in the United States.
Let me turn to the question of the importance of the unofﬁcial sector.
The authors draw a rather extreme conclusion from their analysis: “From
the perspective of economic growth, one should not expect much from the
unofﬁcial economy, with its millions of entrepreneurs, except to hope that
it disappears over time.” However, the paper does not discuss in any detail
the characteristics of “unofﬁciality” that are critical to economic perfor-
mance. Nonregistration per se is not obviously important. At the very least,
it should be unlawful nonregistration. There is no way to know whether
ﬁrms are not registered because they are small, or small because they are
not registered.
As a rhetorical exercise, the paper is appealing. It distinguishes three
views of the unofficial economy: the romantic view, the parasitic view,
and the dual economy view. Aside from the names, however, which are
probably self-explanatory, there is little to the paper’s analysis of the differ-
ent views. The ﬁrst two are actually more similar to each other than to the
third. The romantic view holds that bad laws, barriers to entry, and exces-
sive regulation are holding back the vast pool of entrepreneurship among
people in the informal sector. The parasitic view is in a sense the mirror
image. It holds that implicit subsidies to unregistered small or microscopic
enterprises give them advantages relative to the formal sector, and that this
process undermines productivity and entrepreneurship in the formal sector.
The dual view, in contrast, is that the informal sector is essentially another
world—it goes about its business repairing shoes and the like but has little
linkage with or, for good or bad, inﬂuence on the formal sector.
The paper provides some impressionistic evidence to back the authors’
view. It discusses multiple indicators of informality, which turn out to be
correlated with GDP per capita. However, the causal structure is so com-
plex and the problems of measurement are so great that I take this just as
an interesting correlation. Many of the variables tested, such as access to
electric power and the number of employees in ﬁrms, are only tangentially
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the industry in which a given firm operates. If the dual economy view is
the correct one, there should be a big disconnect between the preferred
industries of the two sets of ﬁrms, whereas under the other two views the
ﬁrms should be in the same industries.
The paper uses three interesting datasets compiled by the World Bank
to investigate the characteristics of informal ﬁrms. We learn a fair amount
about these characteristics, but the paper provides no analytical structure,
no central hypothesis, and little in the way of genuinely exogenous vari-
ables on which to base any analysis. One example of where the analysis is
uninformative is in the productivity analysis. The authors do not measure
productivity in the sense of real output per unit of real input—their “output”
measures are nominal. If the small ﬁrms tend to have low-wage workers
(as the authors indicate they do), then it would follow that value added per
worker will be relatively low. The authors’ defense of their use of nominal
output would apply if those outputs referred to the same industries over
time, or if they could control for industrial composition, but since the mea-
sures have only the crudest of industry controls, there is no convincing
evidence that they measure real productivity growth accurately.
This point can be seen as follows. The budget identity for ﬁrms is pQ ≡
wL/s, where p is price, Q is quantity, w is the wage rate, L is labor inputs,
and s is the share of compensation in the value of nominal output. I suppress
any subscripts for time, country, industry, formality, and so forth for sim-
plicity. Taking logarithms, ln(pQ) = ln(L) + e, where the residual e is equal
to ln(w) − ln(s). This is essentially the equation fitted by La Porta and
Shleifer. Differences across firms reflect only differences in the share of
compensation and in relative wages across ﬁrms. If the shares of compen-
sation are equal, then the only difference is the relative wage rate. The level
of labor productivity or total factor productivity does not even enter the
empirical estimate.
One test that could be helpful would be to compare the incidence of
self-employment in different sectors. For example, in the United States,
ratios of self-employed to employed workers vary from (in rough ﬁgures)
100 percent in agriculture, through 24 percent in construction, to 2
1⁄2 percent
in manufacturing, to zero in utilities. It would be a demanding project, but
I would think that looking at differential employment trends by industry
would provide a better test than a selection of proxies and indicators such
as the level of freedom.
Let me close with a comment on the romantic view of the informal
sector. I am mindful of the observation, attributed to many, that “Anyone
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romantic has no head.” With that in mind, what is the hard-headed roman-
tic’s take on all this? The role of small enterprises is, fundamentally, to
provide radical new approaches to economic activity. The authors claim
that virtually no informal ﬁrms make it into the formal sector. This is akin
to saying that almost no storms become hurricanes and destroy major
American cities. Out of the millions of small enterprises, it does not take
more than a handful of tiny innovational hurricanes causing creative destruc-
tion to make a major contribution to economic growth.
GENERAL DISCUSSION Chang Hsieh interpreted the paper’s evi-
dence as clearly supporting the view of the informal sector as parasitic:
the observed differences in output per worker indicate that the marginal
product of labor is lower in the informal than in the formal sector. He
wondered whether, in addition to the difference in the productivity of
labor between the formal and informal sectors, one could also look at the
productivity of capital in both sectors to determine the weighted average
of the marginal products of capital and labor in the two sectors.
Paul Romer noted that the paper’s conclusion seemed to imply that
although the dual economic structure induces some distortions, it serves
the goal of income redistribution and thus can be left alone. That idea
seemed to him inefﬁcient or even perverse. He suggested a model consist-
ing of an informal sector in which output rises linearly with the labor input,
and a formal sector with Cobb-Douglas output based on educated labor
and unskilled labor, the latter of which can also be used in the informal
sector. A tax on the formal sector ends up being a tax on human capital and
thus serves to redistribute income. However, if foreign direct investment
makes the supply of human capital elastic, such a tax could have large efﬁ-
ciency costs. The result could be that after-tax wages for less skilled workers
are lower than if they were taxed directly. Romer remarked that the paper
itself makes a similar statement, which is inconsistent with other comments
in the paper. He also discussed the difference between catch-up growth
and growth at the frontier: although start-up ﬁrms may be key to the devel-
opment and dispersion of new technology in the United States, established
ﬁrms like Nike might be better at raising wages quickly in developing
countries like Vietnam, because of differences in industrial structures and
dynamics between developing and developed countries.
Lawrence Summers proposed a distinction between two types of formal
versus informal sector dualism, which he called right-wing and left-wing.
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the paper, there are interferences in markets that restrict the size of the for-
mal sector, making it the smaller of the two sectors and with higher mea-
sured productivity. Left-wing dualism, as articulated by the late W. Arthur
Lewis and possibly Michael Todaro, posits a modern sector that has ﬁg-
ured out how to be more productive. Workers in that sector share in the
increased productivity, and therefore everyone would like to work in that
sector. However, because the sector can expand only so fast, it may persis-
tently remain too small, with high wages for the few workers it employs.
Martin Baily, drawing on his own investigations into the informal sector
at the McKinsey Global Institute, offered several examples of interactions
between the formal and informal sectors and particular industry concentra-
tions in the informal sector. He cited Brazil’s retail grocery sector as an
example of the parasitic view (although he objected to the term): a large
number of small, informal supermarkets compete directly with larger, formal
supermarkets; the formal sector chains often acquire the informal stores as
part of an expansion strategy. In Russia, in contrast, the informal sector
deals in moonshine liquor and smuggled goods and thus competes with the
formal sector little if at all. In many of these countries, large government
bureaucracies essentially create the informal sector by necessitating very
high taxes for their support. Tax and regulatory structures need to be
reformed and downsized to bring them more in line with what the public
wants, so that the formal sector can expand more easily.
Eduardo Engel added that the generous subsidies that some governments
provide to the informal sector limit growth of the formal sector just as high
taxes do. Examples are Mexico’s social programs for day care, pensions,
and health care, which are paid for by taxes on the formal sector. He cited
a paper by Santiago Levy, a former Mexican cabinet member and currently
the chief economist at the Inter-American Development Bank, which argues
that these programs were a major source of Mexico’s low productivity
growth in the past few decades.
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